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This paper examines the relationship between firm 
performance and growth and the business environment 
in the countries of the South Asia Region—Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka—using firm-level data from the World 
Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. The analysis uses an approach 
in which the responses of firms to questions about the 
quality of the business environment can be interpreted 
as shadow prices: estimations by managers of the cost 
imposed on the firm by inadequacies of an aspect of the 
business environment—public inputs such as regulation, 
physical infrastructure, availability of skilled labor, 
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macroeconomic conditions, rule of law, etc.—for the 
growth of their firm. The analysis finds, in line with this 
approach, that higher-productivity and better-performing 
firms in the region, and in particular firms that recently 
expanded their employment and created jobs, report 
significantly higher constraints in terms of the supply of 
public inputs. The authors discuss the differences across 
countries in the importance of various industries, how 
they relate to various firm characteristics, how informal 
and rural sector firms are constrained by public inputs, 
and how firms in the South Asia Region countries 
compare with firms in the rest of the world.
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper examines the relationship between firm performance and growth and the 
business environment in the countries of the South Asia Region (SAR): Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  The analysis 
uses data collected for the Enterprise Surveys conducted by the World Bank of formal 
sector firms in the region, along with surveys of informal sector and rural firms in 
several countries.  The paper serves as an input to the World Bank South Asia 
Region’s flagship report, “More and Better Jobs in South Asia”. 
 
Surveys of firms across countries can be used to provide a rich description of how 
managers perceive the costs to them of the business environment in which they 
operate.  Interpreting these surveys requires a conceptual framework, and the analysis 
in this paper uses the approach set out in Carlin et al. (2006, 2010, 2012) and Carlin 
and Schaffer (2012).  In this framework, the responses of firms to questions about the 
quality of the business environment can be interpreted as shadow prices: estimations 
by managers of the cost imposed on the firm by inadequacies of an aspect of the 
business environment – regulation, physical infrastructure, availability of skilled 
labor, macroeconomic conditions, rule of law, etc. – for the growth of their firm.  
Expenditures on mitigation of these costs as reported by firms also fit naturally into 
this framework.  When taken to the data, these predictions inform the policy maker 
whether, for example, it is the case that improvement in a particular element of the 
business environment is likely to benefit well- or poorly performing firms; whether 
public input bottlenecks are more pressing in urban or rural areas; and whether there 
are important differences across industries in the burden of weaknesses in the business 
environment.  Since the focus of the flagship report is on jobs, we examine in 
particular how different elements of the business environment affect firms that are 
expanding employment. 
 
Our modeling framework allows us to interpret clearly the different business-
environment related measures collected in enterprise surveys and to formulate 
hypotheses as to how they relate to firm efficiency and growth.  It predicts in 
particular that well-performing firms report higher costs of constraints. This insight 
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has the implication that relaxing the constraints on these firms is likely to produce the 
largest increases in output and that scarce resources available to policy makers would 
be better directed toward easing such bottlenecks than in focusing on the bottlenecks 
reported by poorly performing firms. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, we summarize the analytical 
framework used in the rest of the paper and the predictions it generates about how a 
firm’s evaluation of the costs of constraints imposed by its external environment 
would vary with its characteristics; the model is set out in detail in Appendix 1.   
Section 3 describes the Enterprise Survey data available for the SAR countries and 
how the variables in the model map onto the data.  In Sections 4-6 we analyze the 
survey data from formal firms in the region.  As expected, firms that had created jobs 
in the preceding three years reported higher costs of constraints than did other firms. 
Reported costs – shadow prices – varied in the expected way with a number of other 
firm characteristics such as size and location. In Sections 7-8, we use country 
averages of costs of constraints reported by formal sector firms to assess which 
elements of the external environment are more problematic for firms across the region 
and in each country, and in Section 9 we compare these country averages for the SAR 
countries with those reported by formal sector firms in other countries at a similar 
level of development.  Section 10 compares business environment constraints 
reported by formal sector firms in the region with those reported by rural and informal 
sector firms.  Section 11 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Modeling framework 
 
Our modeling builds on the framework in Carlin et al. (2006, 2010, 2012).  The 
framework allows us to interpret clearly the different business-environment related 
measures collected in the Enterprise Surveys and to formulate hypotheses as to how 
they relate to firm efficiency and growth.  Our modeling framework predicts that 
well-performing firms report higher costs of constraints. This insight has the 
implication that relaxing the constraints on these firms is likely to produce the largest 
increases in output and that scarce resources would be better directed toward easing 
such bottlenecks than in focusing on the bottlenecks reported by poorly performing 
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firms. However, it is important to remember that the data collected in the business 
environment surveys provides information only about the constraints facing existing 
enterprises. It is not a useful source for addressing the constraints facing potential 
firms. 
 
Before discussing our framework in more detail, it is useful to address the question of 
why the importance of the business environment for economic performance cannot be 
readily estimated directly using firm-level indicators. 
 
Why can’t the importance of the business environment be estimated directly using 
firm-level indicators? 
 
A commonly-employed approach to using firm-level data to estimate the impact of 
variations in the business environment on firm performance is to estimate a regression 
in which firm performance is the dependent variable and with a measure of the 
business environment as reported by the firm used as a regressor along with various 
covariates.  For example, firm-level data can be used to estimate a total factor 
productivity equation in which output appears on the left-hand side and inputs and 
other covariates appear on the right-hand-side along with one or more business 
environment measures.  There are three reasons why such an attempt to estimate the 
effect of variations in the business environment at the level of the firm on productivity 
(or growth) is likely to be unsuccessful.  
 
First, the many dimensions of the business environment are likely to be correlated, 
which makes it very difficult to tease out their separate effects on performance.  
Inclusion in the regression of single measures of the business environment reported by 
the firm is likely to result in endogeneity/omitted variable bias, whereas including 
many measures and controls will typically lead to very imprecisely estimated 
coefficients (the “curse of dimensionality” problem). This is the same problem faced 
by attempts to uncover the institutional determinants of growth in cross-country 
studies.3 
 
                                                 
3  See, e.g., Easterly (2009), Dethier (2008, 2010), or Durlauf et al. (2005) for discussions of the macro 
literature. 
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Second, even if there was only one candidate dimension of the business environment, 
for its effect on firm-level productivity to be estimated requires that it vary at the level 
of the firm. This is clearly not the case for a number of elements of the business 
environment such as macroeconomic stability and the court system. 
 
Third, in cases where there is variation at the level of the firm, its effect on 
performance can be estimated only if there is a way of isolating the quality of such a 
firm-level micro-business environment from the firm’s characteristics. 
 
A simple example illustrates the problems. It is plausible that a higher productivity 
firm will attract more attention from rent-seeking bureaucrats; hence, a naïve 
regression of firm performance on the number of visits would produce a positive 
estimate of the effect of bureaucratic attention on performance. The major research 
strategy adopted to get around this problem and uncover the effect of inspections on 
firm performance separate from the effect of firm performance in attracting 
inspections has been to use the so-called “cell averages” approach. Instead of using 
the firm’s own report on the number of visits, the average number reported by firms 
with similar characteristics (such as firm size, industry and location) is used.  The cell 
averages approach is one of the strategies for addressing the endogeneity bias problem 
recommended by Dethier et al. (2008, 2010) in their survey paper. 
 
However, the cell averages approach runs into an immediate problem.  Unobservable 
characteristics that cause or are correlated with higher productivity of the firm in 
question will also tend to raise the productivity levels of the other firms in the cell 
(e.g., a local demand or industry-specific shock will boost capacity utilization and 
performance). This will tend to raise the prevalence of inspections, expenditure on 
abatement such as bribes and the seriousness of this element of the business 
environment reported by the firm. This is an example of Manski’s (1993) “reflection 
problem”. 
 
The econometric challenge in trying to tease apart differences in the institutional 
environment faced by firms in a single country while avoiding the problem of 
endogeneity, is too much for the data to bear, which is why a recent careful study of 
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the data for transition economies that tried to do just this, Commander and Svejnar 
(2009), found largely null results. 
 
The three problems with attempting to uncover the relevance of elements of the 
business environment by estimating directly a production function augmented by 
business environment indicators can be avoided by taking a different approach. 
Following Carlin et al. (2006, 2010), we take as our starting point that the business 
environment is external to the firm and that to an important extent, firms in a country 
share the same environment. This suggests that firm level information be used in a 
different way from the augmented production function method. Specifically, we 
formulate predictions as to how the firm’s response to its business environment in 
terms of its expenditure on abatement and its evaluation of the costs imposed on it by 
deficiencies in the business environment varies with its characteristics, including its 
performance.  In short, a firm-level assessment of the business environment is an 
endogenous variable in the modeling framework and as the dependent variable in 
estimations.  The framework can be also used to address the relative importance of 
different aspects of the business environment in different countries.  
 
Modeling framework: Summary 
 
The model is set out in Appendix 1 and we summarize it here.  We use a simple 
single-period firm production function with 4 inputs, L, E, B and G, which are 
combined to product output Y.  L is employment; E is an intermediate input that is a 
flow of services which results from combining a public input B with G, an input the 
firm purchases in order to mitigate the effects of the unreliability of the public input. 
Firms also differ in productivity, which we capture with a productivity parameter A.  
We index countries by j and firms by i.  In our basic model, the public input B that is 
supplied on identical terms to all firms in a country, so we write it as jB .  This 
captures the notion of a shared “business environment” – jB  varies across countries 
but not across firms within a given country.  We then extend the model to cover the 
case where the public input varies with the firm’s productivity or profitability. 
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For example, if jB  is the quality of the electricity supply from the grid, and ijG  is the 
firm’s generator, then jB  and ijG  combine to create the firm’s electricity input ijE .  
Spending money on ijG  means the firm can generate its own electricity when there is 
an interruption in supply from the main electricity grid ( jB ).   Electricity is then 
combined with labor to create output.  Although the quality of the business 
environment at country level cannot be directly observed, there are country-level 
proxies for jB such as the degree of reliability of the electricity supply (e.g., in terms 
of outages). 
 
Corruption is another example.  In this case, jB  is a measure of the honesty of 
government bureaucrats in country j, but the public input ijB  supplied to firm i 
depends not only on jB  but also on productivity ijA : high productivity firms will 
attract attention from dishonest government officials looking for bribes. As a 
consequence, the quality of the public input supplied to high productivity firms will 
be lower than that supplied to low productivity firms that are ignored by the bribe-
seeking officials.  Thus if jB  is the honesty of the bureaucracy in country j, ijB  is the 
inverse of the number of inspections that a firm with productivity ijA  attracts (more 
inspections means a lower quality public input ijB  supplied to the firm), and ijG  is 
bribes. 
 
Central to our analysis are the “Subjective Severity” indicators collected in the 
Enterprise Surveys.  These are responses to questions about a feature of the business 
environment faced by the firm, where the question takes the form, “How much of an 
obstacle is X to the operation and growth of your business?”, and the respondent rates 
the severity on a 5-point scale of 0 (“no obstacle”) to 4 (“very severe obstacle”). 
 
The key point about these subjective severity indicators is that these are not estimates 
of the country-wide public input jB , or even of the public input ijB  supplied to firm i; 
they are valuations of the public input.  A simple and intuitive interpretation is that 
the “reported cost” Rij of a public input is the gap between the firm’s profit in the 
 8 
hypothetical situation where the public input provided is of such high quality that it 
poses a negligible obstacle to the firm’s operations, and the firm’s profit in reality, 
given the actual quality of public input provided.  We show in the Appendix that Rij 
can be interpreted as the shadow price of shortcomings in the public input jB . 
 
The core predictions of the model (see the Appendix) are that better performing firms 
(faster growing, higher productivity, etc.) 
• spend more on mitigation, ∗ijG (e.g., are more likely to have a generator; are 
more likely to pay bribes); 
• report better public input services ijE
∗  in cases where the input service is not a 
function of firm-level productivity (e.g., are more likely to report fewer delays 
at customs); 
• report higher or lower public input services ijE
∗  in cases where the input 
service is a positive function of firm-level productivity (e.g., outcome depends 
on the offsetting effects of a higher number of inspections and greater 
expenditure on bribes); 
• report higher costs of public input constraints, ijMRC
∗ . 
 
 
3. Mapping the framework to the data 
 
In this section, we show how the framework is matched with the data in the Enterprise 
Surveys. We begin by identifying a number of proxy variables for unobserved firm 
productivity and firm growth. We then summarize the variables that are proxies for 
the reported costs or shadow prices of constraints, ijR , mitigation costs 
*
ijG , the flow 
of public input services *ijE  and the shared business environment jB . 
 
Performance variables 
 
We define the following measures of firm performance that are available in the 
Enterprise Surveys. 
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• Growth of permanent employment: this is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if there was an increase in the number of permanent employees over 
the preceding three years.4 
• Labor productivity: the log of value added per worker, where value added is 
defined as sales less spending on raw materials and deflated using a PPP-based 
year-specific exchange rate. 
• Total factor productivity: this variable is constructed as a simple residual using 
logs of sales, employment, fixed capital and material, with weights on the 
latter three variables set to 0.25, 0.10 and 0.65, respectively. 
• R&D-firm: this is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm reports 
that it does R&D. 
• Process or product innovation: this is a dummy variable that take the value of 
1 if the reports that it introduced a new process or product during the previous 
three years. 
• Sales to MNCs: the percentage of sales reported to have been made to multi-
national companies. We interpret this as an indicator of external evaluation of 
the firm’s quality. 
• Education top level of the manager: this is measured in years of education. 
• Average education level of the production workforce: this is also measured in 
years of education. 
• Training offered: this is a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has 
an in-firm training program. 
• Per cent of production workers trained: this relates to the firm’s in-firm 
training. 
 
The reported costs of public input constraints 
 
Measures of ijR , the reported cost or shadow price of public inputs, are available in 
the SAR data:  “How much of an obstacle is XX to the operation and growth of your 
business?”  The model predicts that these will be positively related to measures of 
productivity and growth: they will be increasing in ijA  and positively correlated with 
                                                 
4 If permanent employment data is not available for a firm for 3 years earlier, a shorter period is used. 
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measures that are also correlated with ijA .  The public inputs for which we have data 
are: 
• Electricity 
• Telecoms 
• Transport 
• Customs 
• Unfair competition  
• Access to land 
• Crime/theft/disorder 
• Tax administration 
• Business licensing 
• Political instability 
• Government policy instability 
• Corruption 
• Operation of the courts and legal system 
• Macroeconomic instability 
• Labor regulation 
• Skilled labor shortages 
 
There is another question that is best interpreted along with the reported costs 
measures. Firms are asked about the adequacy of their access to water. When they 
report “insufficient water”, this can be interpreted as meaning that “insufficient water” 
is an obstacle to production. Had they answered “sufficient water” then this would be 
equivalent to the answer above of “not an obstacle”. We therefore consider water 
together with the other public input constraints. 
• Sufficient supply of water 
 
 
Mitigation outlays 
 
Measures of mitigation costs *ijG  will also be increasing in ijA . The following 
indicators of mitigation outlays are included in the Enterprise Surveys. 
 
• Bribes (=1 if the firm paid bribes, =0 if not) 
• Managerial time dealing with regulatory issues (%) 
• Generator (=1 if the firm has its own generator, =0 if not) 
 
 
The flow of public input services 
 
Measures of the flow of services *ijE  that are available in the Enterprise Surveys are: 
 
 11 
• Average number of days for exporter to get goods through customs. This is an 
inverse measure of the speed with which goods are processed through 
customs.  
• Total number of inspections by officials per year. This is also an inverse 
measure; a higher number of inspections reduces the flow of services from the 
relevant public input. 
 
Firm-level estimates of the shared business environment 
 
There is only one indicator of jB  in the Enterprise Surveys, namely the firm’s 
experience of interruptions to the power supply.  We use this in dummy variable 
form: 
• Power cuts (=1 if more than one per month, =0 otherwise) 
 
 
How can the answers to the “Access to Finance” and “Tax Rates” questions be 
interpreted? 
 
There are a number of reasons why “finance” and “tax rates” cannot be interpreted in 
the same way as the public input constraints (Carlin et al. 2006).  
 
If finance had the character of a public good like telecoms or customs regulation then 
we would expect that a high score would mean that better access to finance would 
boost output. However, because of the agency problems characteristic of the firm, 
better access to finance may result in more funding of pet projects that do not raise 
output (on average) but lead to higher default rates.   
 
Where the finance system is working well, we would expect that access to finance is a 
constraint on at least some managers.  This is not the case of a well-functioning 
electricity system or customs administration.  
 
Finally, if financial institutions are functioning well, the perception of its availability 
as a constraint should be inversely related to the quality of investment projects the 
firm has available to fund, so that high scores may indicate poor quality projects 
rather than the potential for increased output. 
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The interpretation of responses to managers as to the importance of tax rates for the 
operation of their business faces similar difficulties as the interpretation of the 
importance of access to finance, and partly for similar reasons.  Just as managers do 
not take account of the social benefits of a financial system that constrains access to 
finance by aiming to screen out poor projects, they also do not take account of the 
social benefits arising from government spending funded by the taxes they pay. 
 
We suggest that the way to interpret the responses of managers on tax rates is that 
they point to the costs imposed on firms if public inputs are supplied at the cost of 
higher taxes than necessary. Tax rates are very highly ranked as a constraint by 
managers in virtually all countries (irrespective of their level of development) but it 
does not follow that it is a priority everywhere to cut taxation. A high ranking is 
probably better interpreted as indicating that policies to reduce tax rates while holding 
other aspects of public infrastructure provision constant (for instance, by improving 
administrative efficiency) would improve firm performance. 
 
For the public input constraints, we use the survey answers to get at the private cost to 
the firm of inadequate or unreliable public inputs or burdensome regulation. It is not 
possible to use micro data of this kind to uncover whether tax rates are a key 
constraint to firms – firms are unlikely to take into account the public inputs that are 
paid for by taxation when responding to the question. 
 
 
4.  Are job-creating firms in the South Asia Region also high-performance firms? 
 
The analysis in this paper relates to formal-sector firms in 8 South Asia Region (SAR) 
countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka.  The data were collected in a series of surveys over the 10-year period 
2000-2010.  Tables 1 and 2 present the number of firms and the median permanent 
employment by country and year.  Firms in the three most-populous countries – India, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan – account for 80% of the total sample.  Most of the firms 
surveyed are SMEs; median permanent employment is 19 persons.  This is true of the 
individual surveys as well; the exceptions are the surveys in Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka in 2002 and 2003, where permanent employment in the median firm exceeded 
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100 persons. All the estimations reported below, both regressions and correlations, 
use country fixed effects.  This includes pairwise correlations, i.e., these are pairwise 
partial correlations with country effects partialed out. 
 
When investigating the role of external constraints on firm performance, our modeling 
framework highlights that it is the firms that are performing well that are predicted to 
report higher costs of constraints. This insight has the implication that relaxing the 
constraints on these firms is likely to produce the largest increases in output and that 
scarce resources would be better directed toward easing such bottlenecks than in 
focusing on the bottlenecks reported by poorly performing firms.  
  
Before introducing the results on business environment constraints, it is important to 
understand the correlations among the indicators of firm performance.  Country 
means for these performance measures are given in Table 3.  Differences across 
countries will be discussed in a separate piece.  Note that these are unconditional 
means, and the differences by country are influenced by differences in sample 
composition (e.g., manufacturing vs. services).  Note also that some measures, 
notably R&D activity and sales to MNCs, are not available for some countries.   
 
Is it the case that permanent employment growth is concentrated in firms that are also 
successful when measured by the other performance criteria? Broadly speaking the 
answer is yes. The green cells in Table 4 show a positive and significant correlation 
between the growth of employment variable and whether the firm does R&D, its 
introduction of a new process or product, the education level of the top manager and 
of the workforce, as well as measures of in-firm training.  
 
These are unconditional correlations (more precisely, they are conditioned on country 
fixed effects only). It is also important to know whether the performance correlations 
with the growth of employment remain once other firm characteristics are taken into 
account. As a first step, Table 5 shows that larger, more established, more 
internationally engaged firms, and those located in large cities are also the ones where 
jobs are most likely to have been created.  
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Definitions of the control variables for firm characteristics: 
 
• Firm size: measured by the log of the firm’s average number of employees 
over the previous three years. 
• New firm: this is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is 4 years old or 
less. 
• Services: this is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms in the 
services sector; the benchmark is manufacturing. 
• Foreign: this is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has a 
foreign owner with a stake of at least 10%. 
• Exporter: this is a dummy variable that the value of one if the firm exports at 
least 10% of its sales, either directly or through intermediaries. 
• Importer: this is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm imports directly.5 
• Small city or rural: this is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
firm is located in a small city or rural area. 
 
Table 6 reports the means for these controls by country and for the sample as a whole. 
 
Once we partial out these firm characteristics and re-do the correlations of 
performance measures, Table 7 shows that the patterns shown in Table 4 remain 
broadly unchanged. The employment growth variable is significantly correlated with 
most of the other performance measures – and each of those continues to be correlated 
with most of the other measures.  
 
Note that employment growth is not positively correlated with the level of labor 
productivity or total factor productivity. This is explained by the fact that there will be 
a spurious negative correlation between a firm’s employment growth and its level of 
productivity when it hires additional labor in order to expand output. When the 
control variables are included, the correlation between employment growth and labor 
productivity is significantly negative. The reason is that part of the positive 
correlation between the controls and both job growth and labor productivity is 
                                                 
5 Since the importer status variable is missing for some countries, we include a “missing importer” 
dummy variable that allows us to include many firms for which this variable is missing. 
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removed once the controls are included. Hence, the spurious negative correlation 
between employment growth and labor productivity is then much stronger. 
 
The outcome of this initial descriptive analysis is that job creation is associated with 
specific firm characteristics and with a wide range of other indicators of firm 
performance. Job growth takes place in larger, more established firms that are 
internationally engaged – and these firms are also more likely than others to be 
innovative, and to have a more educated manager and workforce.  On the basis of this, 
we move to examine how the reported costs of constraints vary with firm 
performance. 
 
 
5.  How does firm performance affect the evaluation of constraints imposed by 
the external environment? 
 
Our modeling framework predicts that better-performing firms report higher 
constraints from the external environment. Do we find this pattern in the data? In the 
analysis that follows, we look first at how the evaluation of business environment 
constraints varies with firm performance. In order to do this, we regress the firm’s 
evaluation of the seriousness of each element of the external environment on the 
performance measure and on the standard set of controls introduced above (firm size, 
firm age, industry, ownership, exporter status, importer status, and location, plus 
country fixed effects).  The results we report use heteroskedatic-robust standard 
errors. 
 
Means by country of the firm’s evaluation of constraints, and of mitigation outlays, 
the flow of services of public inputs, and of the shared business environment, are 
reported in Tables 8 and 9. The virtually universal problems with electricity supply in 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan are highlighted by the results 
reported in column 8 of Table 9: almost all firms report at least one power cut per 
month (and most report at least one per week). Note that although almost all firms in 
these countries face a poor quality business environment in this respect, their 
valuations of this aspect of the environment (the “subjective severity” question on 
electricity) vary.  Over one-third of firms in each of these three countries report that 
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electricity is at most a “moderate” obstacle (3 on the 0-4 scale).  This provides a good 
illustration of how our framework works: all firms in these three countries report that 
the quality of this particular public input ( jB ) is poor, but they differ in their 
estimates of how costly this is for them (Rij). 
 
Public input constraints and firm performance 
 
We begin with the public input constraints (Table 10). The coloring of the cells in the 
table provides an immediate visual impression that firms performing well across each 
of the performance dimensions shown in the top row of the table report higher costs 
of constraints than do less well performing firms (green cells). In the lower part of the 
table, a number of indicators of mitigation expenditure are shown. The predominance 
of green cells there shows that expenditure on mitigation (e.g., bribes, generators) is 
also positively correlated with firm performance.  
 
Benchmark performance measure: job-creation 
Turning to firms that have recently expanded permanent employment (first column 
in Table 10), it is apparent that such firms report higher costs of constraints across 
virtually the whole range of external constraints both in terms of physical 
infrastructure and in the regulatory and broader policy environment. The only 
exceptions among the sixteen constraints (including insufficient water supply) are 
those imposed by “unfair competition” and political instability. Job-creating firms 
also report a higher tendency to pay bribes, are the target of more inspections by 
officials, report a higher frequency of power outages and are more likely to have a 
generator.  
 
Alternative performance measures 
Using the static efficiency measures of performance, higher productivity firms 
complain more about most institutional aspects of the business environment (see 
Table 10). Since higher productivity firms are not necessarily engaged in expansion, it 
is unsurprising that physical infrastructure and access to land and skilled labor are 
reported as less onerous than is the case for job-creating firms. Of the physical 
infrastructure elements, higher productivity firms appear somewhat more troubled by 
poor telecoms than are less productive firms.  
 17 
 
Firms that have undertaken R&D and those that have innovated (introduced a new 
process or product) do not report higher costs of electricity or telecoms constraints 
than do other firms. R&D-firms report fewer problems with transport than other firms 
but higher constraints across the board otherwise. The complaints of innovating firms 
are a little more narrowly focused than for R&D-firms. In both cases, however, higher 
costs of anti-competitive behavior, customs regulation, corruption, access to land, an 
inadequately educated labor force, policy uncertainty and macroeconomic instability 
are reported.  
 
Firms with more highly educated managers also identify a broad range of elements 
of the external institutional environment as more costly than do firms with less well-
educated managers. Like higher productivity firms, those that do R&D and have 
highly educated managers are more likely to pay bribes, have a generator and attract 
more inspections. They also report more management time spent with officials.  
 
The constraints reported by firms with a higher share of educated production 
workers are rather different. In particular, such firms report lower costs associated 
with tax administration and corruption than do other firms and there is no greater 
tendency to pay bribes, spend management time with officials or be inspected than is 
the case for other firms. It is notable that firms with a more educated labor force do 
not report access to skilled labor as more costly than other firms. However, firms that 
are engaged in training do report access to skilled labor as more costly.   
 
Firms that sell to MNCs are prone to report higher costs of access to suitably 
qualified labor and of the courts than firms that are not involved in an MNC 
relationship. Otherwise, reported constraints are lower or no different from non-MNC 
related firms.  
 
To summarize, across a wide range of performance indicators, reported costs of public 
input constraints are significantly higher in better-performing firms. Such firms are 
also likely to be engaged in more activity to mitigate the effects of poor physical and 
institutional infrastructure.  
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Access to finance is different 
 
We conclude this section by examining the results for access to finance.  As explained 
above, a firm’s evaluations of access to finance will behave differently from the 
public good constraints, because when asked about the obstacle to their activities 
posed by difficulties with access to finance, the firm’s own circumstances will 
directly affect the terms on which finance is available and hence its answer to the 
question. In particular, the firm’s answer to a question about how much of an obstacle 
to its operation and growth is posed by access to finance will be influenced by its 
investment plans and its internal financial resources (retentions). One element of the 
firm’s ability to access external finance will be the “objective” state of the financial 
system in the economy (or region). However, the terms on which external finance is 
available and hence the firm’s answer as to its ease of access will be heavily 
conditioned by its need for finance relative to internal sources, and the collateral it has 
available. A characteristic of a well-functioning financial system is precisely its 
ability to direct finance according to firm (or project) -specific quality. 
 
Looking at Table 10, we can see that irrespective of the performance measure, for 
public input constraints, the typical pattern is for better performing firms to report 
higher costs of constraints (green cells). This is not the case for access to finance. 
More efficient firms (as indicated by higher labor productivity and TFP) report lower 
problems with access to finance than do other firms (red cells). This is also the case 
for firms that sell to multinational companies. This highlights the likely causal chain 
from good firm performance to the availability of internal finance and easier access to 
external finance based on sound prior performance and the associated availability of 
collateral.  
 
High productivity firms may also be closer to their optimal capital stock and hence 
have a more limited need for additional external finance. Consistent with this 
interpretation is the finding that firms doing R&D report higher financial constraints 
than firms that do not do R&D. This suggests that informational asymmetries 
associated with innovation are likely to make access to external finance difficult – 
even if R&D is a signal of a potentially dynamic firm.  
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6.  How do the costs of constraints vary with firm characteristics? 
 
In this section, we report the results of our baseline regression, where each business 
constraint is regressed on the job creation variable and a set of controls.  These are 
reported in Table 11.  The coefficient on the indicator for expanding employment is 
identical to that in Table 10 and was discussed above.  Here we discuss the how the 
reported cost of the public input constraints are related to other characteristics of the 
firm. 
 
In our model, the size of the firm is endogenous, i.e., the level of employment chosen 
is the profit maximizing one given the constraint of the supply of public input 
services, the firm’s level of productivity, and prices. The implication is that if we 
could observe the level of productivity, there would be no separate scale effect on 
reported costs of constraints. However, since productivity is not measured perfectly, 
we would expect that variables that are correlated with it to also attract a positive 
coefficient in the reported constraints regressions.  
• In particular, firm size is positively correlated with productivity and we would 
therefore expect larger firms to report higher costs and more mitigation. As 
column 1 in Table 11 shows, this prediction is borne out by the data. Apart 
from electricity and access to land, larger firms report higher costs of 
constraints, and in most cases the effect is significant (green cells). Larger 
firms report significantly lower costs associated with electricity and with 
access to land.  Larger firms report fewer outages are more likely to have a 
generator. Nevertheless, the negative and significant coefficient on electricity 
is an unusual finding. The sign is positive and significant in a large sample of 
firms from across the world; including in the sub-sample of countries with 
levels of per capita GDP similar to those in the SAR sample  
• Firms in services are typically less capital-intensive, less unionized, more 
dependent on communications, and less engaged in trade than are 
manufacturing firms. They would be predicted to be less burdened by the 
electricity network, and by labor regulations and customs administration, and 
to report a higher cost of poor telecommunications. This is the case in the data. 
Services firms also report a significantly lower burden in relation to anti-
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competitive behavior and corruption and a higher burden of the courts, 
political instability, access to land and business licensing. 
• Given their access to their parent firm’s internal capital market it would be 
predicted that foreign-owned firms report fewer problems with access to 
finance than domestically owned ones. This is indeed the case among the 
surveyed firms. They are also less prone to bribe and encounter fewer days of 
customs delay. The only dimensions on which foreign-owned firms report 
more costly constraints than do domestic firms is in relation to political 
instability and government policy uncertainty.  
• Exporters and importers. There are a number of interesting differences in the 
constraints reported by these firms. In terms of physical infrastructure, 
exporters report electricity as a costly constraint whereas importers report 
telecoms and transport as well as electricity as more costly than do non-
importing firms. It is importers rather than exporters that are particularly 
bothered by customs administration. In line with expectations, exporters report 
fewer problems with anti-competitive behavior than do non-exporters; 
importers report the opposite. Macroeconomic instability is especially 
problematic for both types of internationally engaged firms, which is likely to 
reflect sensitivity to exchange rate movements and uncertainty.  
• Location. A direct extension of the modeling framework is the prediction that 
in an economy characterized by uneven development between less dynamic 
rural and more dynamic urban locations, firms in the more urban locations 
would report higher costs of constraints.  Under the assumption that the supply 
of public goods is uniform across the country, this prediction simply follows 
from the greater demands on public inputs in the faster-growing locations, 
which in low income countries are typically the urban ones. To the extent 
more rural locations have objectively worse levels of public input supply, this 
would tend to make it less likely that we would observe the predicted dualism 
result of higher reported constraints in more urban locations.  However, the 
predominance of red cells in the final column of Table 11 confirms the 
dualism prediction: firms in small cities or rural locations report lower costs of 
constraints across the board (including water); the only exception is telecoms, 
which is a low-ranked constraint everywhere and where there is no significant 
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difference by location. Firms in more rural locations are more likely to have a 
generator and report more power outages than do firms in more urban 
locations, but large-city firms report a higher cost of constraint in relation to 
electricity.   
• Established versus new firms. The modeling framework does not have any 
particular predictions as to how firm age should relate to the reported cost of 
constraints. However, as noted above, it is established firms that tend to be 
expanding employment. In terms of reported constraints, there is no difference 
between new and established firms across most institutional elements. New 
firms report higher costs of constraints for telecoms and transport, and lower 
costs for corruption and crime.  
 
 
7.  Are there country differences in the way constraints vary? 
 
Before looking at the way constraints vary across countries, we check for country 
differences in the correlations between the job creation variable and firm 
characteristics (Table 12).  The procedure is the same as that for the pooled sample: 
for each country sample, we report the correlation and partial correlation between the 
job creation variable and the characteristic in question.  The “corr” and “pcorr” 
columns report these correlations.  For comparison purposes, the correlations for the 
pooled sample in Table 5 are repeated in Table 12 in the rows labeled “All”.  We also 
report whether these correlations are significantly different from those for the rest of 
the pooled sample; these are reported in the “Diff?” columns.  These latter tests are 
obtained by a pooled estimation in which a dummy variable for the country of interest 
is interacted with the other variables. 
 
As noted above, in the sample as a whole, firms that expanded employment tended to 
be larger, more established ones located in urban areas that were internationally 
engaged via ownership, exporting or importing. In the India sample, we see that the 
rural-urban pattern is less pronounced than that in the sample as a whole: firms in 
large cities report higher employment growth than in small cities but the difference 
disappears once the other controls are added. The pattern we saw above for the 
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sample at a whole – employment growth in large cities – is driven by the firms in 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
 
The positive correlation between employment growth and the age of the firm in the 
sample as a whole is driven by firms in the sample from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan. Elsewhere there is no strong age of firm effect.  
 
Once other characteristics are accounted for, the positive association between 
employment growth and international engagement is strongest in India.   
 
In the sample as a whole, there is no strong association between job-creating firms 
and either sector or ownership. However, there are some country variations. In 
Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, it is services rather than manufacturing firms 
that are more likely to be job-creating.  
 
Reported constraints – do countries differ? 
 
Our investigation of differences across countries in reported constraints uses a similar 
approach to that above.  We estimate the same regression as with the pooled sample, 
but separately for each country.  Significance tests are reported based on these 
country-by-country estimations.  The results are reported in Table 13; for comparison 
purposes, the results for the pooled sample in Table 11 are repeated here in the rows 
labeled “All”.  We also report in the “Different?” columns whether regression 
coefficients are different in the country of interest vs. the rest of the sample, again 
using the simple procedure of a pooled regression in which the country dummy is 
interacted with the other regressors. 
 
As we have seen earlier, in the sample as a whole in the benchmark regression (job 
creation plus controls), firms that expanded employment reported higher costs of 
constraints virtually across the board. When we look at the individual country 
samples, we find this pattern very clearly for India and Pakistan (note the green and 
the “greater” cells). The countries that look different are Afghanistan and 
Bangladesh. In both the latter countries, job-creating firms tend to report lower rather 
than higher costs of constraints (red and “smaller” cells). It is also growing firms that 
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are less likely to pay bribes and spend less manager time dealing with officials. In 
Bangladesh, growing firms report lower constraints from anti-competitive behavior by 
other firms and labor regulation.  
 
There are also some interesting cross-country differences in reported constraints for 
the firm characteristics, which may be relevant for policy.  
 
The most striking difference among the SAR countries concerns the location 
characteristic. Earlier we found that in contrast to the rest of the region, job-creation 
was uncorrelated with location in India once we controlled for other firm 
characteristics. Elsewhere, employment creation was more prevalent in big city 
locations. Turning to the constraints regression analysis, we find once again that India 
does not reflect the dualism pattern found elsewhere in low income countries. The 
typical pattern is that it is firms in urban (large city) locations that report higher costs 
of constraints than do firms in rural areas including small cities. Indeed for electricity, 
Indian firms in more rural locations report higher constraints than do firms in urban 
areas. In India, large-city firms report higher constraints only in relation to transport, 
courts, labor regulation, and customs administration. However, for the majority of 
constraints, there is no significant large city – small city gap in the reported cost of 
constraints in India.  
 
The standard dualism pattern for low-income countries (found in the large multi-
region dataset) is characteristic of most SAR countries apart from India. It is 
especially pronounced in Bangladesh and Pakistan (red cells). This suggests that in 
terms of the reported constraints on growth, India is a more integrated economy 
between rural, small city and large city areas than are the other countries in this 
sample.  
 
The positive firm size effects across a range of constraints are weaker in India than 
elsewhere. The difference between services and manufacturing firms is also different 
in India, where it is services firms that complain more about electricity. Unlike the 
case elsewhere, they are also more likely to have a generator and have more frequent 
power outages than do manufacturing firms. In Pakistan, services firms complain 
much less about electricity than do manufacturing firms and are more likely to have a 
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generator and fewer outages. However, services firms in Pakistan report more 
problems in relation to the availability of educated labor than do manufacturing firms.   
 
The other key difference is in relation to exporting firms: in the sample as a whole 
(and elsewhere in the world) exporting firms tend to complain more about physical 
infrastructure and institutions than do non-exporters. In India these exporter effects 
are even stronger. In Bangladesh by contrast, the results are the opposite: exporters 
report lower costs of constraints relative to non-exporters for electricity and most 
aspects of institutional infrastructure. Thus, in relation to exporters, it is Bangladesh 
that stand out from the regional and multi-region sample: for example, exporters 
complain less about customs administration than do non-exporters. In Bangladesh, 
also in contrast to experience elsewhere, exporters complain less about 
macroeconomic instability than do non-exporters. Although the constraints reported 
by Bangladeshi importers are very much in line with the sample overall, Pakistani 
importers stand out from the sample. Importing firms there generally report lower 
constraints than non-importers and than importing firms elsewhere in the region. 
These differences point to the need for more detailed research to uncover what lies 
behind them.  
 
Are there important industry-specific effects? 
 
An important question for policy-makers is whether there are systematic differences 
across industries in the extent to which the quality of public inputs imposes costs on 
firms. We focus on six industries (garments, food and beverages, chemicals, 
electronics, machinery and textiles) and use the samples from the three large countries 
(Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) where each of the six industries is well-represented.  
 
As a first step, we look at whether job creation is concentrated in particular industries. 
We do this by using the pooled sample for the six industries in the three countries and, 
for each industry separately, regress the job creation variable on the dummy variable 
for the industry of interest plus country fixed effects. The results are in Table 14 in the 
“corr” column. They show that job creation is higher in garments and textiles (except 
in India) and lower in food and beverages, and electronics (except in Pakistan). It is 
lower in the machinery sector in Pakistan. 
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However, from a policy perspective, what matters is whether these industry 
differences persist once we control for the other important firm characteristics, i.e. 
size, age, etc. It is very striking that once the standard set of firm-level controls are 
introduced, the differences across industries in job creation mainly disappear. This is 
shown in the column “pcorr” in Table 14, where for the pooled sample, only the 
electronics industry dummy retains its significance. There are few significant country 
differences. Strikingly in the case of Bangladeshi garments, its role as especially job-
creating in the initial regression without the controls switches to the opposite once we 
control for the firm characteristics – it is then less likely to be job-creating than other 
industries.  
 
Finally, when we look at how reported constraints vary by industry either in the 
pooled sample or by country, there are very few significant industry effects. The 
implication of these results for the policy-maker is that there is no basis for 
discriminating across industries when identifying priorities for improving the business 
environment, once the key characteristics we have analyzed here – international 
engagement, size, location, etc. – have been accounted for. 
 
Summary 
 
We summarize the core results of this section by returning to the predictions of the 
modeling framework. Using our baseline performance indicator of job creation, the 
model predicts that firms that expanded employment will: 
• Report higher costs of public input constraints ijR , i.e., higher shadow prices. 
Such firms report higher costs of constraints in fourteen of the sixteen 
dimensions (including adequacy of water supplies).  
• Spend more on mitigation, ∗ijG . The results reported above confirm that such 
firms are more likely to have a generator and to pay bribes. Contrary to 
expectation, they are not more likely to spend management time dealing with 
officials.  
• Report better public input services ijE
∗  (in cases where the input service is not 
a function of firm-level productivity). We find that such firms do not report 
 26 
shorter delays at customs (although higher productivity firms do report shorter 
delays). 
 
These results provide a strong case for a policy focus on the constraints identified by 
firms as most costly. In the next piece, we examine how the relative importance of 
different public input constraints reported by firms varies across countries in the 
sample.  
 
 
8.  Which elements of the business environment matter most for firms and how 
do they vary across countries? 
 
In this section, we use the country averages of the costs of public inputs reported by 
firms, ijR , to assess which elements of the external environment are more problematic 
for firms across the region and in each country. We also compare the country average 
evaluations with those in other countries at a similar level of development. 
 
The data that we use in this section pools the surveys of the SAR countries used above 
with data from the surveys available from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys 
portal.  We consider only formal sector firms in the analysis.   Altogether, the surveys 
cover almost 120,000 firms from over 230 different surveys in 126 countries over the 
period 2000-2010.  Of these, about 16,000 firms were from the 8 SAR countries.  We 
use these firm-level data to calculate country average evaluations, i.e., country means. 
 
In order to correct for differences in survey samples when comparing reported 
constraints across countries, we construct the “conditional country means” for each 
constraint for a standard firm.  The controls included in the estimations are the same 
as those used above: size (log employment), and dummy variables for whether the 
firm is newly established, expanding employment, has substantial foreign ownership, 
is a significant exporter or importer, and is located in a small city.6  Log employment 
is centered on ln(30).  The estimations are identical to the country regressions 
reported earlier; the country conditional means are, in fact, the estimated intercepts 
                                                 
6 Also as previously, we include a dummy variable in case the importer dummy is missing, in order to 
increase the sample size and number of surveys included. 
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reported in the first column of Table 13.  The intercepts can therefore be interpreted as 
estimates of the constraint level in a given country for a benchmark manufacturing 
firm with 30 employees that is domestically owned, with no foreign ownership or 
import/export activity, and that is located in a large or capital city.  These intercepts 
are the “country conditional means” that we analyze below.7  For those SAR countries 
for which we have surveys in multiple years, we obtain year-specific conditional 
means from the means by year of the residuals from the firm-level regression. 
 
The implication of the modeling framework set out above is that job-creating firms 
are likely to benefit most from the success of policy-makers in relaxing the most 
pressing external environment constraints. For the reasons discussed earlier, we focus 
on business environment constraints with a public good character and therefore do not 
include the “Tax Rates” or “Access to Finance” constraints in the main analysis.  The 
latter measures are considered briefly in Appendix 2. 
 
 
The ranking of constraints by country 
 
The conditional country means are reported for each of the SAR countries and for the 
region as a whole in Table 15. The countries are listed according to GDP per capita.  
Because the conditional means are sometimes based on surveys from more than one 
year, GDP per capita used in the table and in the diagrams is a weighted average of 
GDP per capita, where the weights are the survey sample size in the relevant sample 
years. For the region as a whole, political instability, electricity and corruption are the 
three top-ranked constraints. However, there is considerable variation across the 
countries.  
 
The differences between “finance” and the public good constraints discussed above 
mean it is not possible to interpret the country conditional mean for finance as 
comparable with the other constraints. As an example, think of the following 
experiment. If the economy is affected by a positive productivity shock, we would 
expect the average firm to report a higher cost of a public good constraint but lower 
cost of access to finance. Since the responses to the finance question are non-
                                                 
7 The results for the unconditional country means, i.e., when using simple means across firms in a 
given survey, are very similar. 
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comparable with the answers to the other constraint questions, it is not possible to 
create a ranking of constraints that includes finance. Finance is therefore not reported 
in Table 15. 
 
For each country, the country mean score for each constraint is reported and the 
constraints are ordered from the most to the least costly.  
• In every country except Bhutan and the Maldives, electricity is one of the two 
highest ranked constraints.  
• In five of the eight countries, corruption is among the four highest ranked 
constraints.  
• Political instability is in the top three except in Bhutan– but was not included 
in the survey instrument for India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.  
 
Nepal 
Political instability is the top-ranked constraint in Nepal. This is followed by 
electricity, transport and corruption. Only in Bhutan is transport also one of the top-
ranked constraints. Least problematic are access to land, business licensing and the 
courts. 
 
Nepal was surveyed in 2000 and 2009. Electricity and transport were included in the 
two surveys and reported constraints went up in both cases.   
 
Bangladesh 
In Bangladesh, the ranking is electricity, political instability, corruption, and then 
access to land. Least problematic to firms are transport, the courts, and labour 
regulation. 
 
Surveys were conducted in Bangladesh in 2003 and 2007. Most aspects of the 
business environment were included in each survey. There were few substantial 
changes over time: although concern with customs, transport, tax administration and 
anti-competitive practices went down.  
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Afghanistan 
Political instability is the top-ranked constraint in Afghanistan, followed by 
electricity, corruption, and access to land. Problems with business licensing, access to 
skilled labor and labor regulation come at the bottom.  
 
Surveys were conducted in Afghanistan for the years 2006, 2009 and 2010. Only a 
handful of the set of constraints were included in all three surveys. All three surveys 
were relatively small, however, each with only about 100-200 firms used in the 
estimations. No clear trends emerge. We note that the prevalence of power outages 
more than once a month fell sharply between 2009 and 2010 in the unconditional 
mean estimate but once sample composition is controlled for, there is no difference 
between the two years. This highlights the importance of controlling for the influence 
of sample composition. 
 
Pakistan 
The top-ranked constraint in Pakistan is tax administration, followed by a group 
comprising electricity, political instability, government policy uncertainty, the courts 
and corruption. The only other SAR country where the courts are highly ranked as a 
problem is the Maldives. At the bottom of the ranking in Pakistan are transport, access 
to skilled labor and telecoms.  
 
Pakistan was surveyed in 2002, 2007 and 2010. As elsewhere in the SAR, only a 
handful of constraints were included in the 2010 survey. The reported cost of 
electricity as a constraint went up over time. By contrast, concern with corruption had 
a hump-shaped pattern, with the peak in 2007.   
 
India 
Consistent with their importance elsewhere in the region, electricity and corruption 
are ranked top in India. The next most costly elements of the business environment 
are tax administration and labor regulation. Access to land is a problem elsewhere in 
the region but in India, it is one of the least problematic aspects of the business 
environment, along with courts and telecoms.  
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For India, there are surveys from the years 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2010. Only a 
handful of constraints were included in the 2010 survey. However, for those that were 
included, a sharp increase in problems is reported. In particular, electricity emerged 
clearly as the most costly constraint for firms in 2010. It is interesting to note that the 
likelihood of power outages remained fairly constant between 2005 and 2010. This is 
consistent with higher reported costs from electricity as an obstacle to production if 
firms were improving their performance / growing faster and hence suffering larger 
losses from an unchanged level of unreliability of the electricity grid. Labor 
regulation is also reported to be markedly more problematic in 2010 than in 2005. 
 
Sri Lanka 
The top five ranked constraints in Sri Lanka are electricity, government policy 
uncertainty, macroeconomic instability, anti-competitive practices, and labor 
regulations. Firms were not asked for their evaluation of the extent to which policy 
uncertainty and macro instability affected their business in Afghanistan, Bhutan and 
Nepal. Among the countries where these aspects were included, Sri Lanka is the only 
one where they are highly ranked as problems. Firms in Sri Lanka rated business 
licensing, customs, and access to land as least problematic. (A question about the 
obstacles posed by the courts was not included in the surveys in Sri Lanka.) 
 
Sri Lanka was surveyed in 2004 and 2010 but few aspects of the business 
environment were included in 2010; there were no marked changes.  
 
Maldives 
Given its physical environment, it is not surprising that the top-ranked constraint in 
the Maldives is access to land. This is followed by corruption, the courts, and access 
to skilled labor. The least problematic aspects of the business environment in the 
Maldives are telecoms, macro instability, and business licensing. The Maldives was 
only surveyed once, and the survey size was small (about 140 firms were used in the 
calculation of most of the conditional means), so these results should also be treated 
cautiously, despite their plausibility. 
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Bhutan 
The business environment in Bhutan (which was only surveyed once, in 2009) 
impinges on firms quite differently from elsewhere in the region. The top-ranked 
constraints are transport, access to skilled labor regulation, and tax administration. Of 
least concern are the courts, telecoms and political instability. The contrast between 
Bhutan and Nepal in the importance of electricity as an obstacle is particularly 
striking; across the SAR countries, the constraint is lowest in Bhutan and second 
highest in Nepal.  This is not explained simply by the abundance of hydropower in 
Bhutan (about 4/5ths of total generation), since Nepal has the second-most abundant 
hydropower in the region (over 1/4th of total generation).  The size of the Bhutan 
sample was relatively small, however – about 250 firms were used to calculate the 
country conditional means – so the above results should be treated cautiously. 
 
 
9.  How do the SAR countries compare with those outside the region? 
 
It is useful to compare the constraints reported by firms in the SAR countries with 
those outside the region but at similar levels of GDP per capita. The non-SAR country 
conditional means are constructed using the same set of controls as for the SAR 
countries, but in a single regression with country-survey fixed effects.  The fixed 
effects correspond to the conditional means for individual country surveys.  For 
compatibility with the results reported above, we continue to use a single conditional 
mean for each SAR country, i.e., we do not disaggregate by survey.   
 
The SAR and non-SAR conditional means are reported for the main constraints of 
interest in Figures 1-9 below (results for the other constraints are reported in 
Appendix 2).  The log of GDP per capita in PPPs is on the horizontal axis and the 
reported cost of the constraint on the vertical. Heteroskedasticity-robust confidence 
intervals of 5% are shown individually for the SAR countries; these are simply the 
confidence intervals for the estimated constants in Table 13.  The figures also show a 
regression line based on a quadratic in log GDP per capita for the country-survey 
conditional means for the rest of the world. A 95% confidence interval based on the 
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standard error of the predicted mean is also displayed; this confidence interval is 
robust to heteroskedasticity and within-country correlation.8   
 
Electricity, outages and generators 
There is a clear downward-sloping gradient in the electricity chart (Fig 1): firms in 
richer countries report lower obstacles to production from electricity. The high level 
of constraint reported in Nepal, Afghanistan and Bangladesh are partly accounted for 
by these being very poor countries. However, even for such poor countries, the 
problems look serious.  This is particularly striking for Nepal, which as noted above is 
well-endowed with hydro power. Outages are also very high for these three countries 
(Fig 1). The constraints imposed on firms by unreliable electricity in Pakistan and 
India are, respectively, at the upper and lower ends of the confidence interval for 
countries at their levels of GDP per capita. Sri Lanka looks unusual in that it reports 
costs of constraints on the high side for its level of development but low outages. 
However, this may be partly accounted for by its higher use of generators. In general, 
use of generators is higher in the SAR countries than is typical elsewhere. 
 
Fig. 1 highlights the fact that the low reported constraints in the Maldives and Bhutan 
(although imprecisely estimated because of small sample sizes) are partly related to 
their higher income per head than the other countries in the region. But the chart also 
indicates that these two countries are at the low end of problems with electricity 
(including outages) compared with other countries at their level of development.  
 
 
Corruption and bribes 
The relationship between the reported cost of the corruption constraint and GDP per 
capita is characterized by low levels and low variation in reported constraints in rich 
countries and much more variation in poor and middle-income ones (Fig. 2). Of the 
richer SAR countries, Sri Lanka and Bhutan have lower levels of reported constraints 
than is typical at that level of GDP per capita. This appears true of India and 
                                                 
8 A non-overlap of a SAR country confidence interval and the non-SAR country regression line 
confidence interval provides a conservative test of the difference between the estimated means.  That 
is, non-overlap suggests a statistically significant difference, whereas the estimated means could still be 
significantly different even if the confidence intervals overlap. 
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(possibly) Nepal as well.  Bangladesh has higher levels than typical, whereas 
Afghanistan and. Pakistan look unexceptional.  
 
The data on the prevalence of bribes line up with those on corruption, with a high 
prevalence of firms making bribe payments in Bangladesh even for such a poor 
country and a low prevalence in Nepal. The low cost of constraint reported in the 
richer SAR countries of Sri Lanka and Bhutan is reflected in a low prevalence of 
bribes for countries at this level of GDP per capita.   
 
 
Political instability 
Among the SAR countries in which the role of political instability was included in the 
survey, there is a very clear downward income-constraint locus. The richer country 
Bhutan registers a very low cost of this constraint (in the cross-country comparison), 
which contrasts with the higher than typical costs reported in Nepal, Afghanistan and 
Bangladesh. Pakistan is also on the high side for countries at its level of GDP per 
capita.  
 
Access to Land 
There is an interesting degree of variation in the evaluation of problems related to 
access to land among the SAR countries (Figure 4). Across countries in the world, the 
constraint slopes downward as income per capita rises. Among the SAR countries, 
four have predicted values above the regression line and four, below. There are richer 
and poorer countries in each group. In the “high” group are Bangladesh, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and the Maldives. The exceptional problems of the Maldives are highlighted 
in the chart. Afghanistan and Bangladesh (and Pakistan in the 2007 survey) also look 
unusual relative to other poor countries in the extent of access to land problems. The 
contrast with Nepal is very clear. In India and Sri Lanka access to land appears to be 
less problematic as compared with countries at a similar level of development.   
 
Water 
Problems with the availability of water (Figure 5) tend to be high in the SAR 
countries as compared with countries at similar levels of development (the exception 
is the Maldives). The problems in Pakistan are especially notable.  
 34 
 
Labor regulation 
The chart (Figure 6) suggests that this element of the business environment becomes 
more costly to firms as GDP per capita rises. Most of the SAR countries report 
elevated levels of this constraint as compared with other countries at their level of 
development. This is especially in the case for Nepal, India and Sri Lanka. 
 
Courts 
Problems with the courts look unusually serious in Pakistan (Figure 7). By contrast, 
this dimension of the business environment appears less problematic than might be 
expected at their level of GDP per capita in Nepal, India and Bhutan. The contrast 
between Pakistan and India along this dimension of the business environment is very 
striking. 
 
Inadequately educated labor 
Firms in the SAR countries do not identify problems posed by inadequate access to 
skilled labor as especially serious – as compared with countries at their level of 
development (Figure 8). The only exception is the case of Bhutan. Indeed for Nepal, 
Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, the costs of this element of the external environment 
are rated below that of their comparators. 
 
Telecoms 
The chart (Figure 9) highlights the fact that for most countries in the world, telecoms 
is a low-ranked constraint. This is also true of firms in the South Asia region. 
Problems appear more serious in Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka than is 
typical of countries at their levels of development. 
  
 
10.  A comparison of business environment constraints between formal sector 
firms and rural and informal sector firms 
 
Surveys have been conducted of rural firms in Bangladesh, Pakistan & Sri Lanka and 
of informal sector firms in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. However, the sample for 
India is much larger (over 2,000 firms as compared with about 200 and 400 firms for 
the other two countries with informal sector surveys). We therefore confine the 
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comparison of informal firms to India. We compare the reported constraints on firm 
growth for rural and informal sector firms with those of formal sector firms, which 
were used in the previous analysis in the paper. The informal sector survey of India 
includes only manufacturing firms.  
 
For the formal/rural comparison, we pool the rural sector firms for the three countries. 
For both the formal/rural and formal/informal comparisons, the comparison group are 
the firms in the Enterprise Surveys for the relevant set of countries, which we call 
“formal”. Only manufacturing firms in the Enterprise Surveys are included for the 
comparison with informal firms. 
 
We do two exercises for the formal/rural and formal/informal comparisons. The first 
is to compare the levels of the reported constraints in the two groups of firms (Tables 
16 and 18.  The second is to examine whether there are any differences between 
formal and rural or informal sector firms in how constraints are ranked (Tables 17 and 
19).  
 
In the left hand panel of Table 16 (specification 1), we show the unconditional mean 
evaluations of each obstacle for formal sector firms and informal or rural sector ones. 
To facilitate comparison between the formal and informal/rural sectors, we show the 
results for small formal sector firms (dropping from the samples those firms with 
more than 20 employees). The column headed “Diff?” shows whether there is a 
statistically significant difference between the mean for the small formal and the 
informal/rural sector firms.  
  
The right hand panel of Table 16 (specification 2) includes a size control for firm 
characteristics interacted with an informal or rural dummy (plus country-survey fixed 
effects). This allows the two groups of firms being compared (formal vs. informal and 
formal vs. rural) to have their own coefficients on the size control.  We can interpret 
the constant or the constant plus the dummy as means conditioned on size. 
  
The benchmark firm is the same as in the rest of the analysis except that it is centered 
at average employment of 5 persons, which is more appropriate given the size 
distribution of informal and rural firms.  In the comparison of small formal vs. rural 
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firms in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka, median employment in small formal firms 
is 10 (compared to 35 employees for all formal firms in these three countries), and in 
rural firms is 1.5.  In the comparison of small formal vs. informal manufacturing firms 
in India, median employment in small formal firms is again 10 (compared to 20 
employees for all formal manufacturing firms in the India surveys), and in informal 
firms is 4.  The remaining size disparity between small formal firms, on the one hand, 
and rural or informal firms, on the other, is why we condition on size in specification 
2 as described above. 
 
Levels comparisons between rural and formal sector firms 
 
The results for the comparison of rural with formal sector firms are clear and echo the 
results reported above in Section 7 for the large city / small city comparison using the 
Enterprise Survey data (Table 16). Rural firms almost always report that the elements 
of the business environment represent less serious obstacles to their firm’s production 
and growth than is the case for managers of formal sector firms. This is highlighted by 
the predominance of red shaded cells in both specifications. (Note that the number of 
observations for “Competition” and “Crime, theft and disorder” is very small and 
these results should be treated with caution.)  
 
The results in the lower part of the table are interesting because they accord with what 
one would expect of rural firms: they have much lower engagement with officials 
(bribes, inspections, management time) and report lower costs of corruption and the 
range of institutional constraints. Rural firms report similar levels of power outages 
and they are more likely to have a generator than formal sector firms. They rate the 
problems associated with access to electricity as less problematic than do formal 
sector firms, which suggests that they make less use of electricity in their production 
process.  
 
Comparison of rankings of constraints by rural and formal sector firms 
 
Table 17 presents the results in a slightly different way in order to highlight how the 
different firm types rank the constraints. Using the unconditional means in the first 
column, we see the results familiar from above, namely that electricity, political 
instability, and corruption are the highest ranked constraints for formal sector firms. 
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In the second column, we see that little changes if we restrict attention to the small 
formal sector firms. The constraints most important to rural firms are rather different. 
Three of the top four constraints are common to the two groups of firms: electricity, 
macroeconomic instability and political instability.  
 
The most striking difference is that for rural firms, corruption is a much lower ranked 
constraint: this is consistent with the results reported above that rural firms are less 
engaged in bribes and spend much less time with officials.  
 
Rural firms rank transport more highly as a constraint than do formal sector firms. 
Thus even though rural firms rate transport as less problematic for their business than 
do formal sector firms, they rank it more highly as a concern. The former result is 
consistent with the model used in the paper: formal sector firms value the losses 
associated with unreliable transport more highly than do rural firms. However, rural 
firms rank transport more highly, which likely reflects the fact that the transport 
infrastructure is considerably poorer in rural areas and that among the various 
business environment constraints, this one is especially burdensome.  
 
The higher ranking of anti-competitive practices and crime, theft and disorder by rural 
than formal sector firms is based on a very small sample and probably not much can 
be inferred safely from this.  
 
Levels comparisons between informal and formal sector firms (Manufacturing & 
India only) 
 
It is important to keep in mind when reviewing these results that they are drawn from 
a single country (India) and relate only to manufacturing sector firms.  
 
In contrast to the results for the rural firms, informal sector firms report higher 
constraints in 12 of the 17 cases (Table 18). They report lower constraints in two 
(electricity and customs) and the same level for corruption.  
 
Informal sector firms report a lower engagement in bribes and spend less management 
time with officials – as would be expected. However, they report the same number of 
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inspections as do formal sector firms. They report more frequent power cuts but are 
no more likely to have a generator than formal sector firms.  
 
Comparison of rankings of constraints by informal and formal sector firms 
 
In terms of rankings (Table 19), we note first that political instability was absent from 
all of the India surveys. Electricity, corruption and tax administration were the three 
highest ranked constraints among formal sector firms (“all” and “small”). The ranking 
of constraints by informal sector firms was quite different. Electricity was in the 
middle of the ranking – so although informal firms reported more power cuts and 
there was the same prevalence of generators, their lower ranking of electricity 
suggests they were typically much less dependent on it in their production process 
than were formal sector firms.  
 
The top-ranked constraints for informal sector firms were transport, business 
licensing, inadequately educated labor force and access to land. Access to land is 
ranked much lower by formal sector firms – as are business licensing and transport, 
and to a lesser extent access to educated labor. It seems that informal firms answering 
the question about the obstacles to the growth of their firm are reflecting on the core 
factors of production that limit them attaining scale and perhaps making it worthwhile 
attaining “formal” status.  
 
 
11.  Conclusion 
 
We have used firm-level data from surveys of firms in the South Asia Region to 
assess the constraints presented to firms by shortcomings in the provision of public 
inputs.  As predicted by the modeling framework, better performing firms, and 
notably those that are job-creators, are more constrained by these shortcomings than 
are other firms, and are more likely to be engaged in activity to mitigate these 
shortcomings.  We also find that characteristics associated with high productivity, 
such as export activity and firm size, are also associated with higher reported 
constraints.  We also find significant variation across countries in terms of which firm 
characteristics are associated with constraints originating with which public inputs, 
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and in terms of which public input constraints firms rank as most important in their 
countries. 
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Table 1: Sample sizes by country and year 
Country 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 Total 
Afghanistan      325  640 965 
Bangladesh   1,085    1,504  2,589 
Bhutan        250 250 
India 886 1,825 260  2,286    5,257 
Maldives     145    145 
Nepal 222       368 590 
Pakistan  964    931   1,895 
Sri Lanka    425     425 
Total 1,108 2,789 1,345 425 2,431 1,256 1,504 1,258 12,116 
 
         
Table 2:  Median employment by country and year 
Country 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 Total 
Afghanistan      15  10 11 
Bangladesh   153    45  80 
Bhutan        15 15 
India 40 18 28  17    20 
Maldives     28    28 
Nepal 82       15 25 
Pakistan  26    12   20 
Sri Lanka    113     113 
Total 48 20 108 113 17 13 45 11 24 
 
 
Table 3:  Means of measures of firm productivity and growth 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Afghanistan 0.23 9.37 3.07 0.79 na na 10.81 7.4 0.13 
Bangladesh 0.41 8.27 2.84 0.32 0.45 5.83 11.97 7.06 0.2 
Bhutan 0.64 9.61 na na na na na na 0.26 
India 0.38 9.45 3.11 0.28 0.53 32.7 13.38 10.72 0.18 
Maldives 0.61 9.63 3.56 na 0.44 43.92 11.55 9.33 0.69 
Nepal 0.43 8.61 2.76 na 0.21 na 12.47 7.63 0.1 
Pakistan 0.37 9.55 3.27 0.47 0.12 35.46 12.65 6.87 0.11 
Sri Lanka 0.51 8.78 3.07 0.1 0.21 28.95 11.44 9.05 0.4 
Total 0.39 9.16 3.07 0.31 0.44 31.7 12.63 8.92 0.18 
Notes: (1) Expanding employment; (2) log VA/L; (3) TFP; (4) R&D; (5) Sales to MNCs; (6) Education 
of the top manager; (7) education of the workforce; (8) training programme in place; (9) trained 
workers. 
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Table 4: Correlations of expanding permanent employment with other indicators of firm productivity and growth
expand_p log_lprod tfp rd newPP sales_MNCedu_topmaedu_prodWftrain pct_prod_workers_train
expand_p . Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Expanding permanent employment
N 7,824      6,662      9,117      9,633      2,352      11,007    9,587      11,468    6,885      
log_lprod . Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Log VA/L
N 7,824      6,463      6,031      6,405      2,112      7,282      6,503      7,415      4,351      
tfp Pos . Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos TFP
N 6,662      6,463      5,577      5,547      1,860      6,444      5,730      6,357      4,110      
rd Pos Pos Pos . Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Firm does R&D
N 9,117      6,031      5,577      7,959      2,279      8,835      8,228      8,973      6,085      
newPP Pos Pos Pos Pos . Pos Pos Pos Pos Introduced new product/process
N 9,633      6,405      5,547      7,959      2,278      9,164      8,366      9,155      5,926      
sales_MNC Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos . Pos Pos Pos Percent of sales to MNCs
N 2,352      2,112      1,860      2,279      2,278      2,332      2,177      2,320      367         
edu_topma Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos . Pos Pos Pos Education level of top manager in years
N 11,007    7,282      6,444      8,835      9,164      2,332      9,070      10,515    6,548      
edu_prodW Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos . Pos Pos Average education level of the production workforce in years
N 9,587      6,503      5,730      8,228      8,366      2,177      9,070      9,554      6,135      
ftrain Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos . Pos Training offered
N 11,468    7,415      6,357      8,973      9,155      2,320      10,515    9,554      6,565      
pct_prod_w Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos . % of production workers that were trained
N 6,885      4,351      4,110      6,085      5,926      367         6,548      6,135      6,565       
Notes: Partial correlations; country fixed effects are partialled out. 
“Pos” and green indicates a positive correlation significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5: Correlations of expanding permanent employment with firm characteristics
Characteristic Country corr N pcorr N
Size (log average L) All 0.049** 11,953 0.035** 11,893
New firm All -0.056** 12,139 -0.039** 11,893
Services All -0.009 12,201 0.045* 11,893
Foreign All 0.050 12,201 -0.012 11,893
Exporter All 0.143** 12,201 0.087** 11,893
Importer All 0.121** 12,201 0.053** 11,893
Small city or rural All -0.027** 12,201 -0.003 11,893
corr = Controls are country fixed effects.
pcorr = Controls are country fixed effects plus other firm characteristics  
Notes: Green indicates a positive correlation; red a negative correlation. 
 *=significant at the 5% level; **=significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 6:  Means of firm controls 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Afghanistan 2.59 0.51 0.77 0.05 0.06 0.34 0.06 
Bangladesh 4.38 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.34 0.40 0.18 
Bhutan 2.85 0.24 0.65 0.06 0.18 0.65 0.71 
India 3.38 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.14 0.31 
Maldives 3.39 0.29 0.66 0.00 0.09 0.66 1.00 
Nepal 3.35 0.21 0.19 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.52 
Pakistan 3.16 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.16 0.13 0.21 
Sri Lanka 4.80 0.08 0.00 0.19 0.68 0.42 0.76 
Total 3.54 0.17 0.12 0.03 0.21 0.23 0.29 
Notes: (1) Log employment; (2) New firm; (3) Services firm; (4) Foreign ownership >10%; 
(5) Exporting >10% of sales; (6) Direct importer; (7) Small city or rural location. 
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Table 7: Partial correlations of expanding permanent employment with other indicators of firm productivity and growth
expand_p log_lprod tfp rd newPP sales_MNCedu_topmaedu_prodWftrain pct_prod_workers_train
expand_p . Neg Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Expanding permanent employment
N 7,791      6,625      8,903      9,375      2,290      10,731    9,509      11,299    6,859      
log_lprod Neg . Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Log VA/L
N 7,791      6,437      6,006      6,373      2,095      7,252      6,476      7,383      4,339      
tfp Pos . Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos TFP
N 6,625      6,437      5,545      5,511      1,835      6,410      5,701      6,321      4,098      
rd Pos Pos Pos . Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Firm does R&D
N 8,903      6,006      5,545      7,751      2,228      8,642      8,171      8,870      6,065      
newPP Pos Pos Pos Pos . Pos Pos Pos Pos Introduced new product/process
N 9,375      6,373      5,511      7,751      2,216      8,930      8,291      9,033      5,902      
sales_MNC Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos . Pos Pos Pos Percent of sales to MNCs
N 2,290      2,095      1,835      2,228      2,216      2,271      2,140      2,274      362         
edu_topma Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos . Pos Pos Education level of top manager in years
N 10,731    7,252      6,410      8,642      8,930      2,271      9,000      10,378    6,527      
edu_prodW Pos Pos Pos . Pos Average education level of the production workforce in years
N 9,509      6,476      5,701      8,171      8,291      2,140      9,000      9,477      6,114      
ftrain Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos Pos . Pos Training offered
N 11,299    7,383      6,321      8,870      9,033      2,274      10,378    9,477      6,540      
pct_prod_w Pos Pos Pos Pos . % of production workers that were trained
N 6,859      4,339      4,098      6,065      5,902      362         6,527      6,114      6,540       
Notes: Controls are: country fixed effects; log employment (size); new firm; services; foreign; exporter; importer; missing importer indicator; small city. 
 “Pos” and green indicates a positive correlation significant at the 5% level.  “Neg” and red indicates a negative correlation significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 8:  Means of evaluations of external constraints  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Afghanistan 2.69 1.58 1.41 1.37 1.43 2.12 1.32 1.17 2.95 2.25 1.09 1.98 0.38 0.99 na na 0.24 
Bangladesh 2.93 1.37 1.26 1.56 1.33 1.96 1.99 1.32 2.80 2.46 1.21 1.91 0.83 1.52 1.84 1.83 0.22 
Bhutan 0.84 0.53 1.30 1.09 0.58 0.86 1.29 1.20 0.20 0.74 0.50 1.67 1.31 1.35 na na 0.36 
India 1.75 0.52 0.85 1.01 0.87 0.71 1.55 0.89 na 1.70 0.44 1.16 1.13 1.02 1.03 0.92 0.21 
Maldives 1.13 0.81 1.25 1.12 1.07 2.27 0.59 0.47 na 1.87 1.69 2.59 1.23 1.93 1.52 0.87 0.01 
Nepal 2.74 0.57 1.58 0.98 0.97 0.29 0.90 0.33 3.41 1.32 0.11 1.11 1.02 0.54 na na 0.21 
Pakistan 2.33 0.75 0.94 1.02 1.28 1.45 1.84 1.05 2.15 2.21 2.00 1.64 0.88 0.95 1.96 2.12 0.45 
Sri Lanka 2.04 0.95 1.16 0.88 1.07 0.50 0.80 0.50 na 1.04 na 1.14 1.37 1.32 1.66 1.60 0.35 
Total 2.24 0.80 1.08 1.17 1.10 1.23 1.61 1.00 2.55 1.95 0.91 1.51 0.97 1.13 1.43 1.44 0.26 
 
Notes: (1) Electricity; (2) Telecoms; (3) Transport; (4) Customs; (5) Competition; (6) Access to land; (7) Tax admin.; (8) Bus. licensing; (9) 
Political instability; (10) Corruption; (11) Courts; (12) Access to financing; (13) Labour regulations; (14) Inadequately trained labour; (15) 
Government policy uncertainty; (16) Macro instability; (17) Insufficient water supply. 
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Table 9:  Means of measures of mitigation, public input services, and the shared 
business environment 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Afghanistan 0.49 12.25 0.75 n.a. 11.88 1.00 
Bangladesh 0.86 4.01 0.62 16.59 8.72 0.96 
Bhutan 0.05 17.17 0.23 n.a. 2.10 0.24 
India 0.45 6.48 0.59 8.91 8.44 0.69 
Maldives 0.38 6.33 0.41 2.98 4.67 0.04 
Nepal 0.08 8.50 0.48 n.a. 10.08 0.99 
Pakistan 0.46 2.62 0.36 9.52 10.01 0.56 
Sri Lanka 0.16 3.84 0.75 16.16 7.80 n.a. 
Total 0.51 5.97 0.56 11.27 8.59 0.75 
 
Notes: (1) Bribes; (2) Management time; (3) Firm owns a generator; (4) Number of 
inspections; (5) Days delayed in customs; (6) Power cuts more than once per month. 
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Table 10: Public input constraints and firm productivity/growth
Expand L N Log VA/L N TFP level N R&D (1/0) N Innovate N
Sales to 
MNCs N
Man. educ 
(years) N
L educ 
(years) N
Electricity 0.081** 10,913    0.011 6,921      -0.003 5,825      -0.052 7,951      0.004 8,397      0.001 2,285      0.005 9,809      -0.014** 8,893      
Telecoms 0.060** 9,192      0.020* 5,364      0.040* 4,328      0.022 6,746      0.044 6,945      0.000 2,266      0.015** 8,348      0.010* 7,535      
Transport 0.140** 10,809    0.017 6,885      0.008 5,807      -0.061* 7,921      0.104** 8,343      -0.002** 2,284      -0.002 9,712      0.011** 8,852      
Customs 0.112** 9,916      0.045** 6,408      0.001 5,453      0.107** 7,643      0.116** 7,652      -0.001 2,239      0.025** 8,932      0.026** 8,344      
Competit 0.040 10,398    0.029* 6,493      0.045 5,452      0.087* 7,706      0.232** 7,901      -0.001 2,274      0.010* 9,351      0.021** 8,613      
AccessLand 0.049* 10,590    -0.002 6,832      -0.021 5,777      0.212** 7,699      0.032 8,101      -0.002** 2,282      -0.016** 9,530      -0.005 8,611      
TaxRates 0.114** 10,556    0.050** 6,649      0.055* 5,600      0.158** 7,893      -0.001 8,078      0.000 2,263      0.025** 9,510      -0.006 8,792      
TaxAdministration 0.170** 10,530    0.048** 6,643      0.062* 5,594      0.164** 7,891      0.020 8,057      0.000 2,261      0.038** 9,487      -0.009* 8,772      
BusLicensing 0.078** 10,437    0.022* 6,650      0.001 5,729      0.103** 7,660      0.039 7,973      0.000 2,197      0.013** 9,381      0.006 8,481      
PoliticalInstability 0.040 3,607      0.030 2,650      0.001 1,958      0.107 1,388      0.052 2,378      n.a. -          0.012 2,839      -0.002 2,324      
Corruption 0.216** 10,588    0.023 6,677      0.061* 5,615      0.183** 7,920      0.070* 8,143      -0.001 2,272      0.035** 9,537      -0.012* 8,835      
Courts 0.098** 5,747      0.012 4,469      0.047 3,582      0.108* 3,479      0.019 4,418      0.001* 1,975      0.028** 4,921      0.016* 4,170      
AccessFinancing 0.012 10,783    -0.029** 6,831      -0.063** 5,779      0.132** 7,939      0.020 8,300      -0.002** 2,278      -0.005 9,707      -0.002 8,810      
LaborReg 0.054* 10,321    0.017 6,666      -0.012 5,617      0.066* 7,687      0.063* 7,877      -0.001 2,269      0.018** 9,307      0.000 8,590      
InadEducLabor 0.131** 10,815    0.014 6,873      -0.003 5,804      0.081** 7,923      0.109** 8,324      0.002* 2,286      0.022** 9,734      0.001 8,827      
GovPolicyUnc 0.114** 8,149      0.034** 5,492      0.016 5,084      0.194** 7,642      0.199** 7,186      0.000 2,255      0.020** 7,954      0.006 7,648      
MacroInstability 0.109** 8,847      0.018 6,010      -0.011 5,303      0.192** 7,529      0.147** 7,885      0.000 2,245      0.019** 8,514      0.002 8,391      
bribe 0.035** 9,711      0.014** 5,958      0.027** 5,051      0.059** 7,562      0.066** 7,403      0.000 2,233      0.010** 8,739      0.001 8,144      
mng_time -0.252 11,534    0.019 7,528      -0.102 6,408      0.772** 8,830      -1.363** 9,074      0.014* 2,251      0.130** 10,437    -0.064* 9,442      
generator 0.020* 10,779    0.044** 7,341      0.036** 6,280      0.076** 8,645      0.091** 8,980      0.002** 2,234      0.019** 9,864      0.010** 9,422      
insufficient_water 0.035** 9,518      0.012** 6,769      0.018* 5,859      0.015 7,445      0.070** 7,878      0.000** 1,867      0.003 8,838      0.010** 8,216      
num_insp 2.078** 7,995      0.392* 5,752      0.016 5,390      2.651** 7,581      -0.642 7,047      -0.008 1,835      0.216** 7,841      0.043 7,324      
days_customs -0.495 2,926      -0.529* 1,948      -0.264 1,798      -0.798 2,657      -0.845 2,559      -0.007 381         -0.319* 2,757      0.053 2,728      
m_power_out 0.052** 9,797      -0.001 6,434      0.000 5,369      -0.035** 7,397      0.049** 7,868      0.000 1,979      0.000 8,798      -0.010** 8,350       
Notes: Controls are: country fixed effects; log employment (size); new firm; services; foreign; exporter; importer; missing importer indicator; small city. 
 “Pos” and green indicates a positive coefficient; “Neg” and red indicates a negative coefficient. 
 *=significant at the 5% level; **=significant at the 1% level.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 11: Public input constraints, firm growth and firm characteristics
Country Indicator Size (log L) New firm Expanding L Services Foreign Exporter Importer Missing importer Small city Obs
All Electricity -0.053** 0.004 0.081** -0.164** -0.089 0.079* 0.023 0.261** 0.043 10,913
All Telecoms 0.041** 0.092** 0.060** 0.142** -0.094 -0.055 0.146** 0.002 -0.014 9,192
All Transport 0.018 0.070* 0.140** -0.057 0.052 -0.030 0.270** -0.072 -0.101** 10,809
All Customs 0.101** 0.077* 0.112** -0.016 0.028 0.025 0.294** -0.265** -0.217** 9,916
All Competit 0.017 0.063 0.040 -0.111* 0.047 -0.172** 0.126** -0.013 -0.115** 10,398
All AccessLand -0.045** 0.080* 0.049* 0.062 0.000 0.072* 0.041 0.186** -0.048 10,590
All TaxRates 0.058** -0.094** 0.114** -0.061 -0.184* -0.079* 0.066 -0.079 -0.190** 10,556
All TaxAdministration 0.082** -0.059 0.170** 0.003 -0.143 -0.051 0.058 -0.322** -0.178** 10,530
All BusLicensing 0.024* -0.031 0.078** 0.052 0.023 0.095** 0.099** 0.110* -0.104** 10,437
All PoliticalInstability 0.011 -0.008 0.040 0.120* 0.221* 0.323** 0.067 0.028 -0.226** 3,607
All Corruption 0.038** -0.088* 0.216** -0.032 -0.050 0.038 0.163** 0.202** -0.154** 10,588
All Courts 0.049** -0.032 0.098** 0.129* 0.116 0.174** 0.031 -0.061 -0.121** 5,747
All AccessFinancing 0.000 0.081* 0.012 -0.317** -0.308** -0.111** 0.016 -0.257** -0.145** 10,783
All LaborReg 0.084** -0.032 0.054* -0.094* -0.123 0.083** 0.023 -0.263** -0.130** 10,321
All InadEducLabor 0.045** 0.016 0.131** 0.085 -0.107 -0.010 0.029 -0.153** -0.062* 10,815
All GovPolicyUnc 0.051** -0.079 0.114** -0.020 0.181 -0.047 0.145** 0.272** -0.189** 8,149
All MacroInstability 0.050** -0.046 0.109** -0.013 0.083 0.086* 0.204** 0.405** -0.110** 8,847
All bribe 0.010* -0.001 0.035** -0.018 -0.056* 0.029* 0.040** -0.157** -0.008 9,711
All mng_time 0.327** 0.446 -0.252 0.518 -0.176 1.221** 0.070 -1.034** -0.248 11,534
All generator 0.131** -0.012 0.020* 0.114** -0.039 0.111** 0.071** 0.010 0.093** 10,779
All insufficient_water 0.011** 0.015 0.035** 0.085** 0.002 -0.008 0.038** -0.180** -0.036** 9,518
All num_insp 2.568** 0.099 2.078** 2.322 1.496 1.977 2.848** 2.193 1.438 7,995
All days_customs 0.593** -0.492 -0.495 0.406 -2.921** 2.261** -1.465* -1.614 1.416* 2,926
All m_power_out -0.031** 0.000 0.052** -0.045** -0.045 0.015 0.027* 0.282** 0.076** 9,797  
Notes:  “Pos” and green indicates a positive coefficient; “Neg” and red indicates a negative coefficient. 
 *=significant at the 5% level; **=significant at the 1% level.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 12: Country-specific correlations of expanding permanent employment with firm characteristics
Characteristic Country corr Diff? N pcorr Diff? N
Size (log average L) All 0.049** n.a. 11,953 0.035** n.a. 11,893
New firm All -0.056** n.a. 12,139 -0.039** n.a. 11,893
Services All -0.009 n.a. 12,201 0.045* n.a. 11,893
Foreign All 0.050 n.a. 12,201 -0.012 n.a. 11,893
Exporter All 0.143** n.a. 12,201 0.087** n.a. 11,893
Importer All 0.121** n.a. 12,201 0.053** n.a. 11,893
Small city or rural All -0.027** n.a. 12,201 -0.003 n.a. 11,893
Size (log average L) Afghanistan -0.005 Smaller 941 0.006 Smaller 938
New firm Afghanistan -0.187** Smaller 982 -0.184** Smaller 938
Services Afghanistan 0.074* Greater 985 0.108** Greater 938
Foreign Afghanistan -0.067 Smaller 985 -0.031 938
Exporter Afghanistan -0.062 Smaller 985 -0.104 Smaller 938
Importer Afghanistan -0.052 Smaller 985 -0.037 Smaller 938
Small city or rural Afghanistan 0.234** Greater 985 0.214** Greater 938
Size (log average L) Bangladesh 0.079** Greater 2,589 0.045** 2,581
New firm Bangladesh -0.086** 2,598 -0.079** 2,581
Services Bangladesh -0.246** Smaller 2,606 -0.045 Smaller 2,581
Foreign Bangladesh 0.237** Greater 2,606 0.105 Greater 2,581
Exporter Bangladesh 0.188** Greater 2,606 0.047 2,581
Importer Bangladesh 0.204** Greater 2,606 0.054* 2,581
Small city or rural Bangladesh -0.250** Smaller 2,606 -0.125** Smaller 2,581
Size (log average L) Bhutan 0.027 250 0.015 250
New firm Bhutan -0.004 250 0.031 250
Services Bhutan 0.192** Greater 250 0.169* 250
Foreign Bhutan -0.038 250 -0.066 250
Exporter Bhutan -0.125 Smaller 250 -0.028 250
Importer Bhutan 0.140* 250 0.114 250
Small city or rural Bhutan -0.180** Smaller 250 -0.140* Smaller 250
Size (log average L) India 0.038** Smaller 5,122 0.028** 5,089
New firm India -0.017 Greater 5,234 0.003 Greater 5,089
Services India -0.003 5,269 -0.048 5,089
Foreign India -0.031 Smaller 5,269 -0.116* Smaller 5,089
Exporter India 0.196** Greater 5,269 0.154** Greater 5,089
Importer India 0.110** 5,269 0.043 5,089
Small city or rural India 0.078** Greater 5,269 0.090** Greater 5,089
Size (log average L) Maldives 0.029 145 0.033 145
New firm Maldives 0.150 Greater 148 0.172* Greater 145
Services Maldives -0.079 148 -0.131 Smaller 145
Foreign Maldives 0.000 n.a. 148 0.000 n.a. 145
Exporter Maldives 0.001 148 -0.155 145
Importer Maldives 0.071 148 0.000 n.a. 145
Small city or rural Maldives 0.000 n.a. 148 0.000 n.a. 145
Size (log average L) Nepal 0.036* 590 0.045** 587
New firm Nepal -0.049 588 -0.032 587
Services Nepal 0.025 591 0.093 587
Foreign Nepal 0.199* 591 0.172 Greater 587
Exporter Nepal -0.002 Smaller 591 -0.028 Smaller 587
Importer Nepal -0.047 Smaller 591 -0.022 587
Small city or rural Nepal -0.033 591 -0.031 587
Size (log average L) Pakistan 0.052** 1,891 0.032** 1,881
New firm Pakistan -0.039 1,890 -0.050 1,881
Services Pakistan 0.170** Greater 1,900 0.212** Greater 1,881
Foreign Pakistan 0.185* 1,900 0.067 1,881
Exporter Pakistan 0.058 Smaller 1,900 0.043 1,881
Importer Pakistan 0.133** 1,900 0.049 1,881
Small city or rural Pakistan -0.118** Smaller 1,900 -0.112** Smaller 1,881
Size (log average L) Sri Lanka 0.041** 425 0.032 422
New firm Sri Lanka 0.026 449 0.027 422
Services Sri Lanka 0.000 n.a. 452 0.000 n.a. 422
Foreign Sri Lanka -0.038 452 -0.112 422
Exporter Sri Lanka 0.080 452 0.018 422
Importer Sri Lanka 0.118* 452 0.108 422
Small city or rural Sri Lanka -0.134* Smaller 452 -0.073 422  
Notes: corr=Controls are country fixed effects (“All” only). 
pcorr=Controls are country fixed effects (“All” only) plus other firm characteristics. 
Green indicates a positive correlation; red a negative correlation. 
*=significant at the 5% level; **=significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 13: Country-specific public input constraints, firm growth and firm characteristics 
Notes:  “Pos” and green indicates a positive coefficient; “Neg” and red indicates a negative coefficient. 
 *=significant at the 5% level; **=significant at the 1% level.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
Country Indicator Size (log L) Different? New firm Different? Expanding L Different? Services Different? Foreign Different? Exporter Different? Importer Different?
All Electricity -0.053** n.a. 0.004 n.a. 0.081** n.a. -0.164** n.a. -0.089 n.a. 0.079* n.a. 0.023 n.a.
All Telecoms 0.041** n.a. 0.092** n.a. 0.060** n.a. 0.142** n.a. -0.094 n.a. -0.055 n.a. 0.146** n.a.
All Transport 0.018 n.a. 0.070* n.a. 0.140** n.a. -0.057 n.a. 0.052 n.a. -0.030 n.a. 0.270** n.a.
All Customs 0.101** n.a. 0.077* n.a. 0.112** n.a. -0.016 n.a. 0.028 n.a. 0.025 n.a. 0.294** n.a.
All Competit 0.017 n.a. 0.063 n.a. 0.040 n.a. -0.111* n.a. 0.047 n.a. -0.172** n.a. 0.126** n.a.
All AccessLand -0.045** n.a. 0.080* n.a. 0.049* n.a. 0.062 n.a. 0.000 n.a. 0.072* n.a. 0.041 n.a.
All TaxRates 0.058** n.a. -0.094** n.a. 0.114** n.a. -0.061 n.a. -0.184* n.a. -0.079* n.a. 0.066 n.a.
All TaxAdministration 0.082** n.a. -0.059 n.a. 0.170** n.a. 0.003 n.a. -0.143 n.a. -0.051 n.a. 0.058 n.a.
All BusLicensing 0.024* n.a. -0.031 n.a. 0.078** n.a. 0.052 n.a. 0.023 n.a. 0.095** n.a. 0.099** n.a.
All PoliticalInstability 0.011 n.a. -0.008 n.a. 0.040 n.a. 0.120* n.a. 0.221* n.a. 0.323** n.a. 0.067 n.a.
All Corruption 0.038** n.a. -0.088* n.a. 0.216** n.a. -0.032 n.a. -0.050 n.a. 0.038 n.a. 0.163** n.a.
All Courts 0.049** n.a. -0.032 n.a. 0.098** n.a. 0.129* n.a. 0.116 n.a. 0.174** n.a. 0.031 n.a.
All AccessFinancing 0.000 n.a. 0.081* n.a. 0.012 n.a. -0.317** n.a. -0.308** n.a. -0.111** n.a. 0.016 n.a.
All LaborReg 0.084** n.a. -0.032 n.a. 0.054* n.a. -0.094* n.a. -0.123 n.a. 0.083** n.a. 0.023 n.a.
All InadEducLabor 0.045** n.a. 0.016 n.a. 0.131** n.a. 0.085 n.a. -0.107 n.a. -0.010 n.a. 0.029 n.a.
All GovPolicyUnc 0.051** n.a. -0.079 n.a. 0.114** n.a. -0.020 n.a. 0.181 n.a. -0.047 n.a. 0.145** n.a.
All MacroInstability 0.050** n.a. -0.046 n.a. 0.109** n.a. -0.013 n.a. 0.083 n.a. 0.086* n.a. 0.204** n.a.
All bribe 0.010* n.a. -0.001 n.a. 0.035** n.a. -0.018 n.a. -0.056* n.a. 0.029* n.a. 0.040** n.a.
All mng_time 0.327** n.a. 0.446 n.a. -0.252 n.a. 0.518 n.a. -0.176 n.a. 1.221** n.a. 0.070 n.a.
All generator 0.131** n.a. -0.012 n.a. 0.020* n.a. 0.114** n.a. -0.039 n.a. 0.111** n.a. 0.071** n.a.
All insufficient_water 0.011** n.a. 0.015 n.a. 0.035** n.a. 0.085** n.a. 0.002 n.a. -0.008 n.a. 0.038** n.a.
All num_insp 2.568** n.a. 0.099 n.a. 2.078** n.a. 2.322 n.a. 1.496 n.a. 1.977 n.a. 2.848** n.a.
All days_customs 0.593** n.a. -0.492 n.a. -0.495 n.a. 0.406 n.a. -2.921** n.a. 2.261** n.a. -1.465* n.a.
All m_power_out -0.031** n.a. 0.000 n.a. 0.052** n.a. -0.045** n.a. -0.045 n.a. 0.015 n.a. 0.027* n.a.  
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Table 13 (continued): Country-specific public input constraints, firm growth and firm characteristics 
 
Country Indicator Size (log L) Different? New firm Different? Expanding L Different? Services Different? Foreign Different? Exporter Different? Importer Different?
Afghanistan Electricity 0.023 -0.105 -0.231* Smaller -0.358** Smaller 0.386 Greater -0.206 0.134
Afghanistan Telecoms 0.015 0.138 -0.160 Smaller 0.147 -0.246 0.452* Greater 0.252*
Afghanistan Transport 0.088 -0.059 0.209 0.166 Greater -0.129 0.414* Greater 0.320**
Afghanistan Customs 0.146** 0.067 -0.163 Smaller -0.131 0.105 0.371* 0.822** Greater
Afghanistan Competit 0.124* Greater 0.234* -0.203 Smaller -0.164 -0.302 0.332 Greater 0.128
Afghanistan AccessLand 0.051 Greater 0.191 -0.049 -0.005 -0.012 0.227 -0.137
Afghanistan TaxRates 0.056 0.035 -0.130 Smaller -0.014 -0.591** Smaller -0.079 0.380** Greater
Afghanistan TaxAdministration 0.074 0.224* Greater -0.018 Smaller 0.069 -0.383 0.094 0.231* Greater
Afghanistan BusLicensing -0.118** Smaller -0.051 0.173 0.234* Greater -0.277 0.160 0.360** Greater
Afghanistan PoliticalInstability 0.158** Greater -0.030 -0.209* Smaller 0.068 0.381 0.146 0.124
Afghanistan Corruption 0.048 -0.025 -0.023 Smaller -0.060 -0.661** Smaller 0.361* 0.402** Greater
Afghanistan Courts 0.040 -0.064 0.204 -0.080 Smaller -0.177 0.152 0.128
Afghanistan AccessFinancing 0.022 0.130 -0.177 -0.225 -0.635** 0.173 0.128
Afghanistan LaborReg 0.030 Smaller 0.020 0.078 0.001 0.056 0.072 0.105
Afghanistan InadEducLabor -0.058 Smaller 0.007 -0.025 0.243* 0.274 0.031 -0.106
Afghanistan GovPolicyUnc n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Afghanistan MacroInstability n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Afghanistan bribe 0.050** Greater 0.045 -0.189** Smaller -0.011 -0.098 0.101 0.274** Greater
Afghanistan mng_time 2.341** Greater 3.420** Greater -3.444** Smaller 3.806* Greater 0.692 3.378 0.356
Afghanistan generator 0.025 Smaller -0.027 0.005 -0.134** Smaller 0.080 -0.092 Smaller 0.003
Afghanistan insufficient_water -0.022 -0.037 -0.076 0.183** Greater 0.072 0.068 0.068
Afghanistan num_insp n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Afghanistan days_customs 4.173* -6.235* Smaller -1.905 3.943 -18.180* Smaller -1.817 3.969
Afghanistan m_power_out -0.004 Greater 0.006 0.005 Smaller -0.006 Greater 0.003 0.002 0.005  
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Table 13 (continued): Country-specific public input constraints, firm growth and firm characteristics 
 
Country Indicator Size (log L) Different? New firm Different? Expanding L Different? Services Different? Foreign Different? Exporter Different? Importer Different?
Bangladesh Electricity -0.064** -0.062 0.018 0.005 -0.029 0.059 -0.056
Bangladesh Telecoms 0.086** 0.142 0.017 -0.294* Smaller 0.149 -0.219* Smaller 0.074
Bangladesh Transport 0.021 0.118 0.057 -0.404** Smaller 0.031 -0.097 0.240**
Bangladesh Customs 0.117** 0.127 0.050 -0.264** Smaller -0.485** Smaller -0.298** Smaller 0.376**
Bangladesh Competit -0.037 Smaller 0.097 -0.128* Smaller -0.275** Smaller -0.183 -0.395** Smaller 0.133
Bangladesh AccessLand -0.054* 0.118 -0.011 0.474** Greater 0.203 0.079 -0.076 Smaller
Bangladesh TaxRates 0.088** -0.205** -0.083 Smaller 0.098 0.034 -0.245** Smaller 0.067
Bangladesh TaxAdministration 0.128** Greater -0.142 0.041 Smaller 0.191 -0.198 -0.234** Smaller 0.158* Greater
Bangladesh BusLicensing 0.009 0.084 Greater -0.001 Smaller 0.110 -0.011 0.156** -0.015 Smaller
Bangladesh PoliticalInstability -0.042 Smaller -0.125 -0.024 0.164 0.430** 0.188** Smaller 0.164*
Bangladesh Corruption 0.066** -0.190* 0.100 Smaller -0.102 0.285 Greater -0.040 0.101
Bangladesh Courts 0.020 -0.112 0.080 0.333** Greater 0.473* 0.187* -0.042
Bangladesh AccessFinancing -0.071** Smaller 0.143* -0.112* Smaller -0.450** Smaller -0.542** -0.192** 0.056
Bangladesh LaborReg 0.019 Smaller 0.042 -0.172** Smaller -0.218** Smaller -0.185 0.178** 0.099
Bangladesh InadEducLabor 0.003 Smaller 0.135* Greater 0.143** -0.150 Smaller 0.174 0.073 Greater 0.016
Bangladesh GovPolicyUnc 0.035 -0.142 0.045 0.118 0.238 -0.107 0.135*
Bangladesh MacroInstability 0.083** -0.197* Smaller 0.075 0.123 0.173 -0.164** Smaller 0.133*
Bangladesh bribe 0.046** Greater -0.070** Smaller -0.007 Smaller 0.045 Greater -0.080 -0.029 Smaller -0.002 Smaller
Bangladesh mng_time 0.235** -0.217 0.837** Greater -1.301** Smaller -0.184 0.468 Smaller 1.042** Greater
Bangladesh generator 0.173** Greater -0.019 0.007 n.a. n.a. -0.110* 0.026 Smaller 0.029
Bangladesh insufficient_water -0.006 Smaller 0.000 0.015 -0.086** Smaller 0.006 0.065** Greater 0.042
Bangladesh num_insp 1.836** -2.416 3.243** 1.056 10.461 1.672 5.527**
Bangladesh days_customs 0.544 1.595 Greater -2.623** Smaller 10.019** Greater -0.676 0.488 Smaller -0.874
Bangladesh m_power_out -0.012** Greater -0.035* Smaller 0.023** Smaller 0.004 Greater -0.015 -0.031** Smaller -0.036** Smaller  
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Table 13 (continued): Country-specific public input constraints, firm growth and firm characteristics 
 
Country Indicator Size (log L) Different? New firm Different? Expanding L Different? Services Different? Foreign Different? Exporter Different? Importer Different?
Bhutan Electricity 0.117* Greater 0.042 0.204 -0.062 -0.426** Smaller -0.189 0.006
Bhutan Telecoms 0.131* 0.226 0.077 0.026 -0.200 -0.023 -0.041
Bhutan Transport 0.263** Greater 0.299 0.167 -0.312 -0.121 -0.089 -0.277 Smaller
Bhutan Customs 0.135* 0.384** Greater 0.081 0.060 -0.006 -0.073 -0.045
Bhutan Competit -0.034 0.051 0.070 -0.307 -0.075 -0.221 0.038
Bhutan AccessLand 0.095 0.048 0.237 0.258 -0.388 -0.141 0.416* Greater
Bhutan TaxRates -0.073 -0.105 0.052 -0.084 -0.419 -0.156 0.399* Greater
Bhutan TaxAdministration 0.049 0.018 0.159 -0.147 -0.901** Smaller -0.620** Smaller 0.110
Bhutan BusLicensing 0.089 0.125 0.117 -0.078 1.635** Greater -0.032 -0.182
Bhutan PoliticalInstability 0.014 0.103 0.032 -0.068 0.099 -0.061 Smaller -0.176 Smaller
Bhutan Corruption 0.042 0.167 0.088 -0.230 -0.433** Smaller -0.423* Smaller 0.022
Bhutan Courts -0.041 0.055 -0.142 Smaller -0.096 -0.458** Smaller 0.007 0.204
Bhutan AccessFinancing -0.060 0.160 -0.047 -0.089 0.374 -0.118 -0.188
Bhutan LaborReg 0.047 -0.122 0.140 -0.289 -0.807** Smaller -0.254 0.250
Bhutan InadEducLabor 0.269** Greater -0.091 0.162 -0.256 -0.627** Smaller -0.240 0.245
Bhutan GovPolicyUnc n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bhutan MacroInstability n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bhutan bribe -0.010 0.031 -0.014 0.036 -0.068** -0.003 0.022
Bhutan mng_time 2.459 -1.885 -1.504 0.724 -10.584** Smaller -2.766 -0.885
Bhutan generator 0.112** -0.002 -0.004 0.067 0.064 0.038 -0.038
Bhutan insufficient_water 0.044 0.109 -0.007 0.120 -0.018 -0.133 -0.190* Smaller
Bhutan num_insp n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bhutan days_customs 0.626 -1.326* 0.294 0.161 n.a. n.a. 0.491 -3.236
Bhutan m_power_out 0.062* Greater 0.126 0.032 -0.079 -0.055 -0.271** Smaller 0.009  
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Table 13 (continued): Country-specific public input constraints, firm growth and firm characteristics 
 
Country Indicator Size (log L) Different? New firm Different? Expanding L Different? Services Different? Foreign Different? Exporter Different? Importer Different?
India Electricity -0.079** 0.099 Greater 0.165** Greater 0.415* Greater -0.438** Smaller 0.253** Greater -0.185** Smaller
India Telecoms -0.008 Smaller 0.023 0.069* 0.118 0.037 -0.075* 0.187**
India Transport 0.011 0.056 0.169** 0.186 0.096 0.014 0.125* Smaller
India Customs 0.066** Smaller 0.044 0.168** Greater 0.065 0.128 0.286** Greater 0.102 Smaller
India Competit 0.003 -0.021 0.040 0.394 0.305 -0.009 Greater 0.278** Greater
India AccessLand -0.061** 0.057 0.020 -0.128 0.079 0.068 0.139** Greater
India TaxRates 0.007 Smaller -0.067 0.219** Greater -0.098 -0.080 0.170** Greater -0.070 Smaller
India TaxAdministration 0.015 Smaller -0.092 0.279** Greater 0.087 -0.140 0.182** Greater -0.074 Smaller
India BusLicensing 0.045** Greater 0.005 0.076* 0.156 -0.019 0.121* 0.190**
India PoliticalInstability n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
India Corruption 0.007 Smaller -0.089 0.271** Greater 0.375 0.024 0.214** Greater 0.075
India Courts 0.075** -0.107* 0.081 n.a. n.a. 0.418* 0.130* 0.035
India AccessFinancing 0.006 0.028 0.040 0.262 Greater -0.168 -0.053 0.092 Greater
India LaborReg 0.064** -0.016 0.150** Greater 0.224 -0.058 0.185** Greater -0.001
India InadEducLabor 0.032* 0.021 0.106** 0.572** Greater -0.185 -0.066 -0.007
India GovPolicyUnc 0.039* -0.060 0.103* 0.068 0.325* 0.105 Greater 0.173**
India MacroInstability 0.032* 0.098 Greater 0.054 0.292 0.097 0.268** Greater 0.298** Greater
India bribe -0.017** Smaller -0.018 0.080** Greater -0.348** Smaller -0.054 0.111** Greater 0.037
India mng_time -0.071 Smaller -0.172 -0.036 -3.966** Smaller 0.545 2.671** Greater -1.728** Smaller
India generator 0.108** Smaller -0.019 -0.001 0.272** Greater 0.012 0.147** Greater 0.108** Greater
India insufficient_water -0.002 Smaller -0.017 Smaller 0.018 0.069 -0.066 -0.058** Smaller 0.105** Greater
India num_insp 2.274** 0.721 2.466* -0.827 -0.735 3.294* 3.887*
India days_customs 0.054 Smaller -1.230 0.771 Greater -6.322** Smaller -1.395 5.544** Greater -0.711 Greater
India m_power_out -0.051** Smaller 0.044* Greater 0.088** Greater 0.126** Greater -0.152* Smaller 0.094** Greater -0.018 Smaller  
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Table 13 (continued): Country-specific public input constraints, firm growth and firm characteristics 
 
Country Indicator Size (log L) Different? New firm Different? Expanding L Different? Services Different? Foreign Different? Exporter Different? Importer Different?
Maldives Electricity -0.265** Smaller -0.251 0.117 0.112 n.a. n.a. -0.060 n.a. n.a.
Maldives Telecoms -0.114 Smaller -0.073 0.058 0.536** n.a. n.a. -0.026 -0.146
Maldives Transport -0.052 0.215 0.151 0.128 n.a. n.a. -0.516 0.070
Maldives Customs -0.110 Smaller -0.190 -0.034 0.776** Greater n.a. n.a. -0.031 -0.114
Maldives Competit 0.012 0.150 -0.061 0.281 n.a. n.a. 0.177 0.244
Maldives AccessLand -0.148 0.019 0.139 -0.117 n.a. n.a. 0.098 n.a. n.a.
Maldives TaxRates -0.045 -0.403 0.418 -0.161 n.a. n.a. 1.059 -0.162
Maldives TaxAdministration -0.064 Smaller -0.176 0.116 0.238 n.a. n.a. 0.388 -0.691** Smaller
Maldives BusLicensing -0.059 -0.176 0.221 0.283 n.a. n.a. 0.129 n.a. n.a.
Maldives PoliticalInstability n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Maldives Corruption -0.140 0.298 0.518 -0.103 n.a. n.a. -0.523 n.a. n.a.
Maldives Courts 0.050 0.436 0.396 -0.148 n.a. n.a. -0.359 n.a. n.a.
Maldives AccessFinancing 0.023 0.130 0.291 -0.037 n.a. n.a. 0.078 -0.141
Maldives LaborReg 0.126 -0.161 -0.143 0.288 n.a. n.a. 0.671 n.a. n.a.
Maldives InadEducLabor 0.057 0.027 0.185 -0.023 n.a. n.a. -0.881 0.587* Greater
Maldives GovPolicyUnc -0.056 0.381 -0.342 0.584* Greater n.a. n.a. 0.785 0.072
Maldives MacroInstability -0.084 0.098 0.024 0.559* Greater n.a. n.a. 0.472 n.a. n.a.
Maldives bribe -0.014 0.075 0.025 -0.010 n.a. n.a. -0.133 -0.259** Smaller
Maldives mng_time -0.324 -2.868 4.068 8.164** Greater n.a. n.a. 3.933* 1.333
Maldives generator 0.175** -0.055 0.034 -0.014 n.a. n.a. 0.097 n.a. n.a.
Maldives insufficient_water 0.004 -0.021 0.022 0.013 Smaller n.a. n.a. 0.003 -0.218** Smaller
Maldives num_insp 0.106 Smaller -1.385 1.310 4.836** n.a. n.a. 1.220 n.a. n.a.
Maldives days_customs -2.607 Smaller -1.902 -1.508 8.430** Greater n.a. n.a. 3.599 2.703
Maldives m_power_out 0.017 Greater -0.058* Smaller 0.000 -0.021 n.a. n.a. -0.043 n.a. n.a.  
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Table 13 (continued): Country-specific public input constraints, firm growth and firm characteristics 
 
Country Indicator Size (log L) Different? New firm Different? Expanding L Different? Services Different? Foreign Different? Exporter Different? Importer Different?
Nepal Electricity -0.031 -0.002 -0.120 0.185 Greater -0.046 -0.465** Smaller -0.113
Nepal Telecoms 0.103 -0.023 -0.194 Smaller 0.376* -0.223 0.031 n.a. n.a.
Nepal Transport -0.138** Smaller -0.217 Smaller 0.033 0.544** Greater -0.227 -0.442** Smaller -0.063
Nepal Customs 0.159** 0.028 -0.014 0.619** Greater 0.156 -0.097 0.101
Nepal Competit -0.003 -0.121 -0.038 0.195 Greater 0.534 -0.256 -0.642* Smaller
Nepal AccessLand -0.038 0.139 0.022 0.189 0.095 -0.164** Smaller 0.044
Nepal TaxRates 0.147* -0.276* 0.099 0.250 Greater -0.049 0.598** Greater 0.269
Nepal TaxAdministration 0.166** -0.065 0.223* 0.018 0.207 0.563* Greater 0.231
Nepal BusLicensing 0.096** Greater 0.152 0.078 -0.063 0.258 0.202 0.242
Nepal PoliticalInstability 0.083 0.070 0.059 0.116 -0.300 Smaller 0.292 0.109
Nepal Corruption 0.315** Greater -0.057 0.115 0.249 -0.081 -0.283 -0.059
Nepal Courts 0.076* 0.023 0.050 0.030 0.321 -0.094 Smaller 0.253*
Nepal AccessFinancing 0.092* Greater 0.082 -0.055 0.065 Greater -0.256 0.117 -0.138
Nepal LaborReg 0.320** Greater -0.079 0.067 -0.207 -0.020 0.204 -0.056
Nepal InadEducLabor -0.009 -0.142 0.023 0.123 0.082 -0.463** Smaller -0.009
Nepal GovPolicyUnc n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nepal MacroInstability n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nepal bribe 0.016 -0.070** Smaller 0.009 -0.071* 0.048 -0.049 0.026
Nepal mng_time 0.347 -0.928 -3.747* Smaller -1.190 -2.474 -5.083* Smaller 7.270
Nepal generator 0.106** 0.105 -0.051 n.a. n.a. -0.154 0.158** 0.283** Greater
Nepal insufficient_water 0.005 -0.034 0.085 n.a. n.a. -0.117 -0.057 0.010
Nepal num_insp n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nepal days_customs 1.623 -3.521 -1.907 -6.383 46.191 -13.746* Smaller -6.007
Nepal m_power_out 0.002 Greater 0.008 0.005 Smaller 0.010 Greater 0.011 Greater -0.015 -0.003 Smaller  
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Table 13 (continued): Country-specific public input constraints, firm growth and firm characteristics 
 
Country Indicator Size (log L) Different? New firm Different? Expanding L Different? Services Different? Foreign Different? Exporter Different? Importer Different?
Pakistan Electricity -0.019 -0.237* Smaller -0.004 -0.643** Smaller -0.143 0.083 0.322** Greater
Pakistan Telecoms 0.063** 0.160 0.181** Greater 0.605** Greater 0.280 Greater 0.029 0.207*
Pakistan Transport 0.016 0.056 0.077 -0.164 0.415* -0.110 0.136
Pakistan Customs 0.152** Greater -0.058 0.093 0.365** Greater 0.274 -0.117 -0.071 Smaller
Pakistan Competit 0.040 0.007 0.263** Greater 0.029 0.152 -0.225* -0.023
Pakistan AccessLand -0.060* -0.028 0.091 -0.420** Smaller -0.087 0.142 0.039
Pakistan TaxRates 0.207** Greater -0.130 0.168* -0.456** Smaller -0.471 -0.339** Smaller -0.260* Smaller
Pakistan TaxAdministration 0.175** Greater -0.325** Smaller 0.104 -0.048 -0.174 -0.485** Smaller -0.342** Smaller
Pakistan BusLicensing 0.058* -0.229* Smaller 0.149* -0.270* Smaller 0.164 -0.156 Smaller -0.143 Smaller
Pakistan PoliticalInstability 0.054 -0.013 0.279** Greater 0.489** Greater 0.251 0.631** Greater -0.376* Smaller
Pakistan Corruption 0.053 -0.138 0.375** Greater -0.379* Smaller -0.223 -0.110 0.019
Pakistan Courts 0.080 0.432* Greater 0.154 0.554** Greater -0.137 0.624** Greater -0.313
Pakistan AccessFinancing -0.005 -0.169 Smaller 0.057 -0.182 -0.317 -0.414** Smaller -0.501** Smaller
Pakistan LaborReg 0.139** Greater -0.144 0.094 0.254* Greater -0.237 -0.227** Smaller -0.048
Pakistan InadEducLabor 0.080** -0.071 0.155** 0.393** Greater -0.357* 0.105 0.138
Pakistan GovPolicyUnc 0.129** -0.105 0.234* -0.529* -0.136 -0.370** Smaller -0.085
Pakistan MacroInstability 0.042 -0.280* Smaller 0.231** Greater -0.250 -0.053 0.018 -0.039 Smaller
Pakistan bribe 0.042** Greater 0.003 0.050* 0.092 -0.258** Smaller -0.075* Smaller -0.103* Smaller
Pakistan mng_time 0.875** Greater 0.793 -0.353 0.865 3.323 -0.158 Smaller 0.676
Pakistan generator 0.167** Greater -0.068* 0.048* 0.302** Greater -0.093 0.101** -0.017 Smaller
Pakistan insufficient_water 0.009 -0.003 0.052* 0.817** Greater -0.089 -0.032 -0.089* Smaller
Pakistan num_insp 5.045** Greater 1.959 -3.156 Smaller 13.842 12.870 -3.146 Smaller -2.293 Smaller
Pakistan days_customs -0.483 Smaller -1.896 -3.766** Smaller -1.874 -3.506 -5.749** Smaller -0.768
Pakistan m_power_out -0.011 -0.089* Smaller 0.013 Smaller -0.335** Smaller 0.054 0.001 0.157** Greater  
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Table 13 (continued): Country-specific public input constraints, firm growth and firm characteristics 
 
Country Indicator Size (log L) Different? New firm Different? Expanding L Different? Services Different? Foreign Different? Exporter Different? Importer Different?
SriLanka Electricity 0.052 Greater 0.413 0.220 n.a. n.a. 0.019 -0.093 -0.099
SriLanka Telecoms 0.076 0.232 -0.104 n.a. n.a. -0.224 -0.076 -0.423** Smaller
SriLanka Transport 0.107* 0.271 0.217 n.a. n.a. 0.087 -0.124 0.577**
SriLanka Customs 0.070 -0.237 0.032 n.a. n.a. 0.009 -0.125 0.820** Greater
SriLanka Competit 0.037 -0.235 0.129 n.a. n.a. -0.002 -0.470** 0.094
SriLanka AccessLand 0.011 0.297 0.298** Greater n.a. n.a. -0.207 0.132 0.057
SriLanka TaxRates 0.065 -0.276 0.142 n.a. n.a. -0.179 -0.634** Smaller 0.397* Greater
SriLanka TaxAdministration 0.008 -0.444** Smaller 0.030 n.a. n.a. 0.038 -0.059 0.401** Greater
SriLanka BusLicensing 0.021 -0.121 -0.020 n.a. n.a. -0.038 -0.056 0.084
SriLanka PoliticalInstability n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SriLanka Corruption 0.165** Greater -0.408* 0.036 n.a. n.a. -0.074 -0.241 0.505** Greater
SriLanka Courts n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SriLanka AccessFinancing -0.041 -0.001 0.161 n.a. n.a. -0.222 -0.032 0.211
SriLanka LaborReg 0.222** Greater -0.342 -0.079 n.a. n.a. -0.161 -0.253 Smaller 0.027
SriLanka InadEducLabor 0.197** Greater -0.360 0.079 n.a. n.a. -0.262 -0.166 -0.142
SriLanka GovPolicyUnc 0.068 -0.311 -0.039 n.a. n.a. 0.018 -0.373* 0.361*
SriLanka MacroInstability 0.115* -0.235 -0.022 n.a. n.a. -0.049 0.122 0.302
SriLanka bribe -0.003 0.025 0.031 n.a. n.a. 0.010 0.001 0.136** Greater
SriLanka mng_time 0.264* -0.033 -0.443 n.a. n.a. -0.178 0.256 Smaller -0.616
SriLanka generator 0.125** -0.074 0.025 n.a. n.a. -0.066 0.128** 0.061
SriLanka insufficient_water 0.006 -0.025 0.037 n.a. n.a. 0.084 -0.063 0.197** Greater
SriLanka num_insp 3.650** -5.238* Smaller -2.303 Smaller n.a. n.a. -3.022 -0.517 -6.970** Smaller
SriLanka days_customs 4.121** Greater -1.707 -1.301 n.a. n.a. -7.004** Smaller 5.113 -16.293** Smaller
SriLanka m_power_out n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
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Table 14: Industry- and country-specific correlations of expanding permanent 
employment with firm characteristics 
 
Industry Country corr Diff? N pcorr Diff? N
Garments All 0.057** n.a. 7,809 0.011 n.a. 7,718
Garments Bangladesh 0.077** 1,866 -0.075* Smaller 1,843
Garments India 0.039 4,590 0.009 4,530
Garments Pakistan 0.068* 1,353 0.039 1,345
Food & beverages All -0.078** n.a. 7,809 -0.032 n.a. 7,718
Food & beverages Bangladesh -0.139** Smaller 1,866 -0.018 1,843
Food & beverages India -0.055* 4,590 -0.054* 4,530
Food & beverages Pakistan -0.001 Greater 1,353 0.074 Greater 1,345
Chemicals All 0.003 n.a. 7,809 -0.003 n.a. 7,718
Chemicals Bangladesh 0.062 1,866 0.074* Greater 1,843
Chemicals India -0.011 4,590 -0.012 4,530
Chemicals Pakistan -0.016 1,353 0.030 1,345
Electronics All -0.049** n.a. 7,809 -0.028 n.a. 7,718
Electronics Bangladesh -0.108** 1,866 -0.057 1,843
Electronics India -0.042* 4,590 -0.016 4,530
Electronics Pakistan -0.026 1,353 -0.028 1,345
Machinery All -0.004 n.a. 7,809 0.016 n.a. 7,718
Machinery Bangladesh -0.058 1,866 0.046 1,843
Machinery India 0.010 4,590 0.026 4,530
Machinery Pakistan -0.046 1,353 -0.056 Smaller 1,345
Textiles All 0.029* n.a. 7,809 0.019 n.a. 7,718
Textiles Bangladesh 0.054 1,866 0.035 1,843
Textiles India 0.032 4,590 0.016 4,530
Textiles Pakistan -0.012 1,353 -0.017 1,345  
 
Notes: corr=Controls are country fixed effects. 
pcorr=Controls are country fixed effects plus other firm characteristics. 
Green indicates a positive correlation; red a negative correlation. 
*=significant at the 5% level; **=significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 15: Rankings of constraints by country 
 
TOTAL TOTAL AFG AFG BGD BGD NPL NPL PAK PAK IND IND
PoliticalInstability 2.58 PoliticalInstability 3.16 Electricity 3.11 PoliticalInstability 3.20 TaxAdministration 2.29 Electricity 1.61
Electricity 2.17 Electricity 2.89 PoliticalInstability 2.86 Electricity 3.11 Electricity 2.15 Corruption 1.58
Corruption 1.83 Corruption 2.13 Corruption 2.39 Transport 2.21 PoliticalInstability 2.12 TaxAdministration 1.44
TaxAdministration 1.66 AccessLand 2.08 AccessLand 2.13 Corruption 1.63 GovPolicyUnc 2.09 LaborReg 1.12
GovPolicyUnc 1.37 CrimeTheftDisorder 1.69 TaxAdministration 1.99 LaborReg 1.46 Courts 2.06 InadEducLabor 0.98
MacroInstability 1.32 Competit 1.55 GovPolicyUnc 1.89 Competit 1.29 Corruption 2.04 GovPolicyUnc 0.97
Competit 1.16 Telecoms 1.32 MacroInstability 1.83 Customs 1.03 MacroInstability 1.97 Customs 0.93
CrimeTheftDisorder 1.15 TaxAdministration 1.24 Competit 1.59 TaxAdministration 1.03 Competit 1.36 CrimeTheftDisorder 0.93
AccessLand 1.15 Customs 1.20 Customs 1.50 InadEducLabor 0.83 CrimeTheftDisorder 1.36 BusLicensing 0.83
Customs 1.13 Transport 1.18 Telecoms 1.48 CrimeTheftDisorder 0.81 AccessLand 1.35 MacroInstability 0.83
InadEducLabor 1.07 Courts 1.17 InadEducLabor 1.47 Telecoms 0.48 Customs 1.27 Competit 0.82
LaborReg 1.05 BusLicensing 0.76 CrimeTheftDisorder 1.32 AccessLand 0.38 LaborReg 1.12 Transport 0.81
Transport 1.04 InadEducLabor 0.74 BusLicensing 1.29 BusLicensing 0.26 BusLicensing 1.08 AccessLand 0.68
BusLicensing 0.94 LaborReg 0.33 Transport 1.24 Courts 0.10 Transport 0.92 Telecoms 0.47
Courts 0.87 MacroInstability - Courts 1.15 MacroInstability - InadEducLabor 0.91 Courts 0.47
Telecoms 0.71 GovPolicyUnc - LaborReg 0.87 GovPolicyUnc - Telecoms 0.67 PoliticalInstability -  
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Table 16 Comparison of reported constraints by formal, small formal and rural firms
Unconditional means Survey fixed effects and log(L) (centered on L=5)
All formal Small formal Rural Diff? Small formal Rural Diff? Obs (SF) Obs (R)
Electricity 2.575 2.563 1.470 Smaller 2.446 1.828 Smaller 2,234 4,888
Telecoms 0.969 0.694 0.318 Smaller 0.602 0.316 Smaller 1,355 4,881
Transport 1.081 0.874 0.696 Smaller 0.864 0.725 Smaller 2,166 4,750
AccessLand 1.606 1.701 0.100 Smaller 1.613 0.066 Smaller 1,747 4,157
InadEducLabor 1.254 0.986 0.183 Smaller 0.929 0.322 Smaller 1,755 4,210
MacroInstability 1.978 1.939 1.619 Smaller 1.795 1.785 1,716 2,428
GovPolicyUnc 1.868 1.622 0.535 Smaller 1.608 0.395 Smaller 955 1,846
PoliticalInstability 2.457 2.290 0.681 Smaller 2.206 0.884 Smaller 1,316 4,029
AccessFinancing 1.677 1.655 1.086 Smaller 1.687 1.013 Smaller 2,143 4,827
Competit 1.308 1.243 1.394 1.200 1.430 1,766 66
TaxAdministration 1.854 1.569 0.099 Smaller 1.328 0.137 Smaller 1,756 4,197
TaxRates 1.820 1.669 0.146 Smaller 1.431 0.205 Smaller 1,762 4,195
LaborReg 0.904 0.677 0.042 Smaller 0.631 0.056 Smaller 2,143 4,202
Customs 1.296 0.811 0.020 Smaller 0.660 0.029 Smaller 1,520 4,091
BusLicensing 1.140 1.035 0.177 Smaller 0.933 0.173 Smaller 1,668 1,763
Courts 1.585 1.553 0.163 Smaller 1.543 0.195 Smaller 1,000 4,231
Corruption 2.137 1.978 0.146 Smaller 1.888 0.159 Smaller 2,211 4,229
CrimeTheftDisorder 1.405 1.271 0.791 Smaller 1.199 0.819 Smaller 1,799 67
bribe 0.591 0.464 0.288 Smaller 0.404 0.212 Smaller 1,691 52
bribe1 0.269 0.205 0.077 Smaller 0.181 0.062 Smaller 1,394 52
mng_time 4.467 2.884 0.118 Smaller 2.436 0.286 Smaller 2,170 5,398
generator 0.515 0.146 0.062 Smaller 0.056 0.091 Greater 1,631 5,416
insufficient_water 0.343 0.302 0.014 Smaller 0.321 0.020 Smaller 1,664 4,031
num_insp 12.652 5.809 0.451 Smaller 5.168 1.608 Smaller 1,283 2,970
days_customs 8.242 5.204 5.204 n.a. 7.396 7.396 n.a. 142 0
m_power_out 0.751 0.727 0.669 Smaller 0.723 0.702 2,014 2,671  
 
Small numbers of observations are noted in red.  Differences are heteroskedasticity-robust tests with a 5% significance level. 
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Table 17 Ranking of constraints: formal, small formal and rural firms
Unconditional means Survey fixed effects and log(L)
(centered on L=5)
Formal Small formal Rural Small formal Rural
Electricity Electricity MacroInstability Electricity Electricity
PoliticalInstability PoliticalInstability Electricity PoliticalInstability MacroInstability
Corruption Corruption Competit Corruption Competit
MacroInstability MacroInstability CrimeTheftDisorder MacroInstability PoliticalInstability
GovPolicyUnc AccessLand Transport AccessLand CrimeTheftDisorder
TaxAdministration GovPolicyUnc PoliticalInstability GovPolicyUnc Transport
AccessLand TaxAdministration GovPolicyUnc Courts GovPolicyUnc
Courts Courts Telecoms TaxAdministration InadEducLabor
CrimeTheftDisorder CrimeTheftDisorder InadEducLabor Competit Telecoms
Competit Competit BusLicensing CrimeTheftDisorder Courts
Customs BusLicensing Courts BusLicensing BusLicensing
InadEducLabor InadEducLabor Corruption InadEducLabor Corruption
BusLicensing Transport AccessLand Transport TaxAdministration
Transport Customs TaxAdministration Customs AccessLand
Telecoms Telecoms LaborReg LaborReg LaborReg
LaborReg LaborReg Customs Telecoms Customs  
 
Small numbers of observations are noted in red. 
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Table 18 Comparison of reported constraints by formal, small formal and informal sector firms (manufacturing & India only)
Unconditional means Survey fixed effects and log(L) (centered on L=5)
All formal Small formal Informal Diff? Small formal Informal Diff? Obs (SF) Obs (I)
Electricity 1.790 1.818 1.572 Smaller 1.817 1.574 Smaller 2,247 1,951
Telecoms 0.515 0.497 0.920 Greater 0.522 0.998 Greater 2,144 1,951
Transport 0.905 0.826 1.836 Greater 0.838 1.840 Greater 2,244 1,951
AccessLand 0.713 0.752 1.672 Greater 0.901 1.686 Greater 2,149 1,951
InadEducLabor 1.013 0.974 1.714 Greater 0.860 1.720 Greater 2,151 1,951
MacroInstability 0.913 0.832 1.149 Greater 0.677 1.160 Greater 2,104 402
GovPolicyUnc 1.033 0.954 1.192 Greater 0.809 1.184 Greater 2,114 402
AccessFinancing 1.203 1.168 1.533 Greater 1.113 1.567 Greater 2,238 1,951
Competit 0.863 0.824 1.376 Greater 0.767 1.382 Greater 2,127 1,951
TaxAdministration 1.551 1.486 1.455 1.432 1.414 2,149 1,951
TaxRates 1.682 1.639 1.531 Smaller 1.586 1.492 2,152 1,951
LaborReg 1.169 1.061 1.576 Greater 0.879 1.588 Greater 2,234 1,951
Customs 1.011 0.878 0.590 Smaller 0.783 0.595 Smaller 2,021 402
BusLicensing 0.891 0.802 1.826 Greater 0.710 1.818 Greater 2,032 1,549
Courts 0.441 0.336 1.591 Greater 0.272 1.585 Greater 1,129 1,951
Corruption 1.681 1.637 1.451 Smaller 1.507 1.431 2,241 1,951
CrimeTheftDisorder 0.960 0.993 1.582 Greater 0.994 1.561 Greater 2,148 1,951
bribe 0.444 0.438 0.237 Smaller 0.312 0.266 Smaller 2,230 1,936
bribe1 0.175 0.173 0.084 Smaller 0.158 0.096 Smaller 1,966 1,623
mng_time 6.624 6.436 1.624 Smaller 5.685 1.704 Smaller 2,538 1,942
generator 0.588 0.417 0.197 Smaller 0.246 0.226 2,410 1,951
insufficient_water 0.213 0.207 1.000 n.a. 0.205 1.000 Greater -999 5
num_insp 8.743 5.832 5.063 4.140 5.125 2,309 128
days_customs 8.470 7.136 7.136 n.a. 5.928 5.928 n.a. 295 0
m_power_out 0.686 0.719 0.942 Greater 0.671 0.943 Greater 2,179 1,320  
 
Small numbers of observations are noted in red.  Differences are heteroskedasticity-robust tests with a 5% significance level. 
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Table 19 Ranking of constraints: formal, small formal and informal sector firms
              (manufacturing & India only)
Unconditional means Survey fixed effects and log(L)
(centered on L=5)
Formal Small formal Informal Small formal Informal
Electricity Electricity Transport Electricity Transport
Corruption Corruption BusLicensing Corruption BusLicensing
TaxAdministration TaxAdministration InadEducLabor TaxAdministration InadEducLabor
LaborReg LaborReg AccessLand CrimeTheftDisorder AccessLand
GovPolicyUnc CrimeTheftDisorder Courts AccessLand LaborReg
InadEducLabor InadEducLabor CrimeTheftDisorder LaborReg Courts
Customs GovPolicyUnc LaborReg InadEducLabor Electricity
CrimeTheftDisorder Customs Electricity Transport CrimeTheftDisorder
MacroInstability MacroInstability TaxAdministration GovPolicyUnc Corruption
Transport Transport Corruption Customs TaxAdministration
BusLicensing Competit Competit Competit Competit
Competit BusLicensing GovPolicyUnc BusLicensing GovPolicyUnc
AccessLand AccessLand MacroInstability MacroInstability MacroInstability
Telecoms Telecoms Telecoms Telecoms Telecoms
Courts Courts Customs Courts Customs  
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Figure 1.  Electricity, Outages and Generators 
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Figure 2.  Corruption and bribes 
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Figure 3.  Political instability 
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Figure 4.  Access to Land 
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Figure 5.  Insufficient water 
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Figure 6.  Labour Regulation 
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Figure 7.  Courts 
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Figure 8.  Inadequately educated labour 
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Figure 9.  Telecoms 
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Appendix 1: Modelling framework 
 
ijG  is a private input chosen by the firm.  jB  and ijG  are substitutes in the production 
of intermediate input ijE , created via an intermediate input production function 
),( ijj GBE .  ijG  is a mitigation cost or input that substitutes for deficiencies in the 
public input jB .  Intermediate input ijE  is combined with labour input Lij via a final 
output production function F and firms-specific technology level Aij, to generate 
output )),( ijijijij ELFAY = : 
 
),( ijjij GBEE =  (1) 
)),(,( ijjijijij GBELFAY =  (2) 
 
The firm’s problem is choose Lij and Gij to maximize profits for given technology Aij, 
public input jB , and relative prices of labour and mitigation, denoted as wj and pj, 
respectively (we normalize the output price to 1; all firms in country j face the same 
prices), and the intermediate input and final output production technology. 9 
 
It is useful to write these as maximum-value or indirect objective functions.  Denoting 
profit-maximizing quantities with a superscript *, we have the input demand functions 
for labour and mitigation, the supply function for output, and the profit function for 
the firm’s maximized profit, all written as functions of the exogenous variables Aij, 
jB , wj and pj. 
 
),,,(* jjjijij pwBALL =
∗  (3) 
),,,(* jjjijij pwBAGG =
∗  (4) 
),,,(*),( * jjjijijjij pwBAEGBEE ==
∗  (5) 
)),(,(),,,(* ∗∗∗ == ijjijijjjjijij GBELFApwBAYY  (6) 
∗∗∗ −−== ijjijjjjjijjjjijij GpLwpwBAYpwBA ),,,(*),,,(*ππ  (7) 
                                                 
9 In addition to the assumption of weak separability that we have already made, F(L,B,G)=F(L,E(B,G), 
and the usual assumptions about the production functions E and F, we also assume that E is strictly 
quasi-concave and homothetic. 
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So far we have assumed that the public input jB  is supplied identically to all firms in 
a country. An example of a public input of this kind is macroeconomic stability.  A 
more realistic assumption would allow for ijB  to vary across firms.  This could result 
from regional variation in the quality of the public input within a country, or simply 
because of random variation in the reliability of the public input, e.g., some firms 
were luckier than others with respect to the number power outages they faced.   
 
An important issue relates to possible differences in infrastructure quality across 
locations. We find in the paper that firms in large cities report higher constraints 
across most dimensions of the business environment than do firms in more rural 
locations. However, this is not because the supply of public inputs, ijB  is lower in 
cities; in fact, our prior is that if infrastructure quality varies between rural areas and 
cities, it is higher in the latter. Thus, when we find that firms in large cities are more 
constrained, this is in spite of having, if anything, better public inputs.   
 
In some cases, however, the public input supplied to the firm will vary with the firm’s 
profitability or productivity.  (Since maximized profit is a function of productivity ijA  
– see above – we simplify and consider productivity ijA  as a proxy for profitability.)  
In this case, we have 
),( ijjij ABBB =           0>∂
∂
j
ij
B
B
          0<
∂
∂
ij
ij
A
B
 (8) 
)),,((),( ijijjijijij GABBEGBEE ==  (9) 
 
An example: jB  is the honesty of the bureaucracy in country j, ijB  is the inverse of 
the number of inspections that a firm with productivity ijA  attracts (more inspections 
means a lower quality public input ijB  supplied to the firm), and ijG  is bribes. 
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We now consider how the firm’s optimal choices of inputs and output, and the firm’s 
valuations of the public input, vary with the quality of the public input jB , and with 
the productivity of the firm ijA . 
 
In the model above, supply and profits are, not surprisingly, increasing in the quality 
of the public input jB : 
 
0
*
>
∂
∂
j
ij
B
Y
,          0
*
>
∂
∂
j
ij
B
π
 (10) 
 
Many such country-level measures are available and have been used in country-level 
studies.  Firm-level surveys do collect some information about the quality of the 
business environment jB .  However, these measures are best interpreted as estimates 
by an individual firm of the quality of the shared environment, in the same way that a 
firm’s answers on a price survey provide information about the market price for a 
specific product.  An example of such a measure from the Enterprise Surveys would 
be a firm’s report of the number of electricity supply interruptions it faced.   
 
Information on mitigation costs ∗ijG  is also collected from firms.  Mitigation 
expenditures are endogenously chosen by the firm.  These expenditures will be 
decreasing in the quality of the public input jB  and increasing in the productivity of 
the firm, ijA : 
 
0≤
∂
∂ ∗
j
ij
B
G
,        0≥
∂
∂ ∗
ij
ij
A
G
 (11) 
 
The second expression is of interest to us in the empirical analysis and has a twofold 
intuitive justification.  In the benchmark case where the public input supplied to all 
firms is identical and independent of firm productivity, i.e. jij BB = , higher 
productivity firms spend more on mitigation because the payoff is bigger than it is to 
low productivity firms.  In the case where the quality of the public input varies 
 76 
inversely with firm productivity, as in the example of higher productivity firms 
attracting more attention from rent-seeking officials, i.e. ),( ijjij ABBB = , the effect is 
reinforced. More profitable firms have an even lower quality public input, and hence 
the payoff to spending on mitigation is even bigger. 
 
The above implies that firm productivity, and proxies for productivity and growth, 
should be associated with higher mitigation outlays.  Moreover, the partial derivative 
ij
ij
A
G
∂
∂ ∗
 can vary systematically across countries, and in particular it will be decreasing 
in the quality of the public input jB : 
 
0
2
≤
∂∂
∂ ∗
jij
ij
BA
G
 (12) 
 
i.e., countries with a lower quality public input, jB  should see stronger correlations 
between mitigation outlays and firm-level productivity. 
 
If the quality or quantity of the public input jB is sufficiently high, the marginal cost 
of additional expenditure on mitigation will be greater than the marginal benefit to the 
firm, in which case optimal mitigation ∗ijG  is zero.  Examples would be expenditure 
on a new generator when the quality of electricity supply is so high that the cost of the 
generator cannot be justified or expenditure on bribes when public officials are 
already so honest that there is no point bribing them. In these circumstances, there 
would be no correlation between mitigation costs and firm-level productivity. 
 
Firms also provide information about the flow of services ∗ijE  obtained from the 
combination of the public input and mitigation expenditures.  An example is the speed 
with which goods clear customs, which is an endogenous result of the quality of the 
customs bureaucracy ( jB ) and of the optimal mitigation costs such as management 
time and bribes aimed at getting the firm’s goods through customs ( ∗ijG ).  In the 
benchmark case where the public input supplied to all firms is identical and 
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independent of firm productivity, the flow of intermediate inputs, ∗ijE , is increasing in 
the productivity of the firm; this follows from the property that mitigation outlays are 
also increasing in the productivity of the firm: 
 
0
))(,( *
≥
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
=
∂
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ij
ij
ij
ij
ij
ijijj
ij
ij
A
G
G
E
A
AGBE
A
E
 (13) 
 
A simple and intuitive interpretation of the “Subjective Severity” indicators collected 
in the Enterprise Surveys is that they represent the “reported cost” Rij of a public input 
is the gap between the firm’s profit in the hypothetical situation where the public 
input provided is of such high quality that it poses a negligible obstacle to the firm’s 
operations, and the firm’s profit in reality, given the actual quality of public input 
provided.  If we denote the level of public input provided in an ideal, high-quality 
business environment as jB , we have 
 
),,(*),,(* jjijjjijij wBAwBAR ππ −=  (14) 
 
The marginal analogue of the reported cost Rij for small changes in the public input, 
or “marginal reported cost”, is therefore simply the derivative of the profit function: 
 
ij
j
ij
ij B
R λ
π
≡
∂
∂
≈
∗
 (15) 
 
We can think of the profit function ∗ijπ  as resulting from a constrained maximization 
by the firm, where the public input jB  is supplied to the firm at a level or quality that 
means the firm would prefer a higher quality or more of it.  By the envelope theorem 
for constrained maximization, the derivative of the profit function ∗ijπ  with respect to 
a constrained or fixed input is simply the shadow price of the input.  Thus we follow 
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Carlin et al. (2006) and interpret the responses to “Subjective Severity” questions as 
the shadow price λij of shortcomings in the public input jB .
10 
 
The shadow price of jB  is decreasing in jB :  
 
02
2
<
∂
∂
≡
∂
∂ ∗
j
ij
j
ij
BB
πλ
 (16) 
 
The shadow price of a constraint is also increasing in the productivity of the firm: 
 
0
2
>
∂∂
∂
≡
∂
∂ ∗
ijj
ij
ij
ij
ABA
πλ
 (17) 
 
i.e., a higher productivity firm will report higher costs of a poor public input than a 
lower productivity firm – even though they share the same business environment. 
 
Lastly, we are interested in firm growth as well firm productivity.  The simplest 
extension to the model that accommodates this is to extend the model to include a 
quasi-fixed input such as capital or workers with permanent contracts.  Now, in 
addition to the optimizing choice of variable inputs ∗ijL  and 
∗
ijG , the firm also chooses 
an optimal level of investment ∗ijI  in the quasi-fixed input.  
∗
ijI  will be increasing in 
the firm-specific parameters that capture future profitability such as ijA . Hence, we 
expect direct measures of ∗ijI , or proxy measures for the parameters that drive the 
cross-firm variation in ∗ijI , to be correlated with 
∗
ijG , 
∗
ijE  and *MRC  in the same way 
as ijA  is above.   
                                                 
10 Carlin et al. (2010) interpret the responses as “reported costs” (RC) in a slightly different framework 
to the one adopted here, namely an O-ring production function in which the quality of the public input 
is measured by the probability that it fails and output is zero.  This allows a response of 0 to be 
interpreted naturally as a zero probability of failure, which in turn implies the firm’s evaluation of the 
quality of the public input is that it is so high that additional improvements would not benefit the firm.  
The difference in formal frameworks is immaterial to the analysis here. 
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Appendix 2: Charts for Access to Finance, and Tax Rates, and the remaining 
elements of the external environment 
 
Although we cannot compare the level of the finance obstacle with the public good 
elements of the business environment, we can look at the cross-country patterns.  The 
results for Nepal and India stand out. In both cases, firms report access to finance as a 
less serious obstacle than is the case in other countries at comparable levels of 
development.  
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As discussed in the paper, it is difficult to interpret managers’ answer to the question 
about tax rates. The cross-country chart reflects the finding that firms in countries at 
all levels of development complain a lot about tax rates. The SAR countries – with the 
exception of Pakistan and the Maldives, which are typical of countries at their level of 
development – tend to report lower obstacles from the tax rate than do firms in other 
countries.  
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Other elements of the business environment 
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